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ABSTRACT 
The recent demise of the Iraqi Air Force creates an airpower vacuum in the region 
that affords the United States an opportunity to garner influence through the development 
of a robust airpower security cooperation program.  The question is what are the 
characteristics of airpower security cooperation that will best serve U.S. interests with 
respect to Iraq and the broader region?  In seeking to answer this question, this thesis 
examines the recent history of U.S. airpower security cooperation with Pakistan and 
Egypt.  The central argument is that these cases suggest that the key variables affecting 
the success of airpower security cooperation as a diplomacy instrument are: 1) the degree 
to which the security cooperation program addresses the recipient’s principal security 
needs as determined by the state’s strategic culture; 2) the degree to which airpower 
assistance facilitates and maintains an appropriate regional balance of power; and 3) the 
degree of trust imbued to the recipient regarding the endurance of the U.S. commitment 
to the security relationship.  If the U.S. can account for these “three tenets” when 
implementing airpower security cooperation with Iraq, it can expect to garner specific 
measures of influence in matters critical to U.S. security interests. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the United States and “the coalition of the willing” invaded Iraq in 2003, 
coalition airpower enjoyed what the USAF calls “air dominance,” an environment in 
which friendly air assets can operate nearly uncontested.1  This rather opportune 
environment developed as a result of the attrition of the Iraqi air defense system through 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the subsequent decade of no-fly-zone operations in 
which coalition air forces routinely retaliated to any acts of a hostile nature.  What 
defenses remained in 2003 were quickly dismantled by the air onslaught and invasion of 
ground forces.  Saddam’s decision to literally bury his remaining fighter aircraft paid a 
symbolically fitting tribute to the disparity in airpower capabilities between the coalition 
and Iraqi air forces. 
The demise of the Iraqi Air Force renders the new Iraqi state wholly dependent 
upon the Unites States to maintain the sovereignty of Iraqi airspace.  With a likely 
reduction or withdrawal of coalition ground forces in the (perhaps near) future, 
Washington must decide how best to posture air forces to both meet Iraq’s security needs 
and further U.S. interests.  Options range from relying on a robust USAF presence with 
minimal Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) capability to embarking upon a serious effort to rebuild 
the IqAF to a level of increased capability and regional significance, with little to no 
American presence.  At the time of writing, the United States has thus far chosen the 
former; the IqAF has been reconstituted with only minimal transport and reconnaissance 
capabilities.  As a result the IqAF has no offensive firepower means, leaving it incapable 
of either defending Iraqi sovereignty or providing any measure of firepower support to 
                                                 
1 Most of the threats posed to coalition air assets were isolated to the low altitude arena, included anti-
aircraft artillery, short-range tactical surface-to-air missiles, and shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles. 
Aircraft were able to mitigate surface threats by operating higher altitudes. Records indicate that only one 
fixed-wing manned aircraft was shot down by a surface threat. Other fixed-wing losses were due to safety 
mishaps or fratricide. USAF CENTAF Assessment and Analysis Division ,Operation IRAQI FREEDOM--
By the Numbers, April 30, 2003, 3. Available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf (accessed 
November 1, 2007). 
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Iraqi Army or other security forces.2  Out of necessity, the USAF is likely to maintain a 
presence in Iraq.  Over the long term, however, policy choices must dictate what Iraqi 
airpower capabilities will best serve the interests of the United States in the region.  In 
lieu of the airpower-vacuum concomitant with the demise of the IqAF the United States 
has a unique opportunity to implement an enduring airpower security cooperation 
partnership with Iraq.  
The question is: what characteristics of an airpower security cooperation 
relationship that will best serve the interests of the United States?  In pursuit of a viable 
policy recommendation, this thesis examines the case studies of airpower security 
cooperation to Pakistan and Egypt to assess the impact these programs have had on the 
diplomatic relationships between the supplier (United States) and the respective 
recipients.  Ultimately, the goal is to be able to provide programmatic recommendations 
to the State Department, Department of Defense, and United States Air Force regarding 
an airpower security cooperation program that pertains to rebuilding the IqAF.  Toward 
this effort, this thesis addresses the following: 
• Have airpower security cooperation programs been implemented with 
clearly articulated policy goals and desired outcomes? 
• What factors determined the success or failure of airpower security 
cooperation as a policy instrument? 
• To what extent has the United States gained diplomatic leverage via 
airpower security cooperation? 
In addition, the thesis assumes the following with regard to U.S. interests:   
• Iraq will be a unitary state with which the United States will be interested 
in maintaining a long-term alliance; 
• Ensuring the sovereignty of Iraqi airspace is essential to regional stability 
and is in the interest of the United States and Iraq;  
• The United States will continue past diplomatic patterns by engaging in 
some measure of airpower security cooperation with the Iraqi government. 
                                                 
2 The author’s intent is not to necessarily criticize funding pertaining to the IqAF thus far, as the 
administration has (appropriately) prioritized resources towards rebuilding the Iraqi Security Forces on the 
ground in order to improve the domestic security situation. Nonetheless, the vacuum in IqAF capability 
remains an unresolved issue.  
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By identifying factors in these programs that have produced both desirable and 
unwanted outcomes, this thesis seeks to make recommendations regarding how best to 
implement an airpower security cooperation program in Iraq over the next two to three 
decades. 
A. SECURITY COOPERATION—A POLICY INSTRUMENT   
Security cooperation is an instrument of national policy broadly defined as those 
activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to build relationships that promote 
U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition 
operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.3   The State 
Department articulates overall objectives conforming to the National Security Strategy 
and also provides funding to the Department of Defense and its service components for 
implementation.  Echoing the various national strategy documents’ emphasis on the 
importance of spreading democratic values, the State Department currently purports that 
security cooperation is a viable instrument through which to promote “the principles of 
democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law” that also assures “allies and 
friendly nations of U.S. commitment to their security.”4 Several “defense policy themes” 
guide security cooperation activities including: a desire to influence key powers, 
cooperating with parties to address regional disputes, combating weapons of mass 
destruction, and combating terrorism.5  Further, in the parlance of joint military doctrine, 
security cooperation is a component of “phase zero” campaign planning—the phase 
referred to as “shaping”—that entails garnering multinational cooperation to “assure [sic] 
                                                 
3 Definition obtained at the website for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/Default.htm (accessed October 28, 2007). Also, Since 9/11 national strategy 
documents such as The National Security Strategy, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The 
National Defense Strategy, The National Military Strategy, and the Quadrennial Defense Review give new 
emphasis to security cooperation as a policy instrument.  
4 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 
and 2006. Released by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, September 2006. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74679.htm (accessed September 24, 2007). 
5 Ibid. 
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success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and 
allies…and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.”6   
As for airpower components of security cooperation, the Secretary of the Air 
Force’s Office of International Affairs develops airpower security cooperation plans in 
support of COCOMs’ theater security operation strategies.  The Air Force Security 
Operation Strategy provides overall guidance and emphasizes the need for common 
interoperable systems, logistics and training, shared CONOPS (concept of operations), 
organizational structures, doctrine, and “most importantly, shared experiences and 
common threat perspectives.”7  The policy contends that “partnership capacity is built on 
relationships” and that long-term interpersonal relationships in particular “provide the 
strongest basis for action and produce the most fruitful Air-Force to Air Force (AF-to-
AF) relationships”8 
B. WHY AIRPOWER MATTERS 
While the bulk of U.S. effort in security cooperation in South Asia and the Middle 
East is currently invested in its more ground-centric elements due to the security 
situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, airpower components of security cooperation are 
unique in that they provide Washington a long-term instrument through which to engage 
partnering states.  Modern airpower weapon systems have a life-span of decades rather 
than years, a time over which the recipient needs technical support and training provided 
by the U.S.  The high cost of modern systems also provides the U.S. with a means to 
establish a degree of dependency onto the recipient through financial cooperation in the 
form of foreign military financing (FMF) or grants.   
Beyond its diplomatic utility, airpower components of foreign-military-sales 
(FMS) allow the U.S. to sustain the defense industrial base by keeping open the assembly 
lines of key weapon systems, thereby retaining critical engineering and technical 
                                                 
6 Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, iv-27. 
7 The United States Air Force, Security Operation Strategy: Building Capacity, Integrating 
Capabilities. Available at http://international.hq.af.mil (accessed September 15, 2007), ii. 
8 Ibid. 
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expertise.  The defense industry also represents one of the few in the U.S. economy that 
contributes positively to the overall U.S. balance of trade position.9  Washington openly 
acknowledges these incentives for promoting FMS—a point which critics contend 
represents a conflict of interest with respect to the principal intent of FMS as a policy 
instrument—to promote peace and stability by bolstering the legitimate national security 
needs of select states.10 
As for the interests of the recipient, the desire to bolster airpower capabilities 
derives from its significance in modern warfare and its ability to forge geopolitical shifts 
among state powers.11  For example, Israel used the combination of airpower’s speed, 
range, and surprise in their defeat over numerically superior Egyptian and Syrian forces 
in 1967; the event solidified the permanence of the Israeli state, doomed the ideological 
movement of pan-Arab nationalism espoused by the likes of Egypt’s Gamel Abdel 
Nasser, and imbued what some describe as a lingering humiliation among Arab  
 
                                                 
9 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Military Training…, op. cit. 
10 Critics fear that economic interests compel U.S. politicians to promote sales of advanced weapon 
systems to states beyond their level of need…something that they argue foments instability as opposed to 
stability. By law, defense articles and services shall be furnished or sold solely: for internal security; for 
legitimate self-defense; to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations; or to assist militaries in less developed countries to 
construct public works and to support economic and social development activities. U.S. Department of 
State, “Legal Basis for Arms Transfers.” Available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rsat/c14022.htm (accessed 
September 24, 2007). 
11 In Phillip S. Mellinger’s 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower, the author argues that airpower 
provides a unique ability to dominate the battlespace, or in other words: whoever controls the air also 
controls the ground. Airpower is an inherently offensive and flexible component of maneuver that can 
achieve militarily strategic effects with relative efficiency—unlike ground-based forces which have to 
directly confront opposing forces; airpower can bypass the bulk of enemy forces and target the enemy’s 
specific centers of gravity. The advent of precision weapons yields a previously unknown efficiency of 
force because of its ability to create strategic effects without having to undergo long drawn-out phases of 
attrition. Also, depending on the sophistication of enemy air defenses, the speed and range of airpower 
forces allows them to achieve surprise more readily than ground-based components. Publication available 
at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/dodandmilitaryejournals/www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publicati
ons/fulltext/10_propositions_regarding_air_power.pdf (accessed November 1, 2007). 
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societies.12  Several other inter-state conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia 
continued to witness the growing significance of airpower, including the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War, the Egyptian-Yemeni War, the Iran–Iraq war, as well as multiple wars 
between Pakistan and India.13  The Gulf War of 1991, however, raised airpower’s stock 
tremendously as the overt and media-catalogued destruction of the Middle East’s 
dominant army created a previously unattained level of prestige for owning and operating 
U.S airpower systems, the evidence of which was the U.S. supplanting other arms 
suppliers in the years following, particularly through a significant growth of U.S.-
manufactured fighter aircraft to the region.14   
Obviously the introduction of modern U.S. airpower weapon systems to the 
Middle East and South Asian states impacts the conventional balance of power in these 
regions.  However, there is also a non-conventional implication that accompanies 
airpower modernization; with the reality of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and the 
potential for proliferation in the Middle East, modern fighter aircraft represent a delivery 
means for a nascent nuclear power.  As a result, levels of “airpower balance” between 
states can profoundly impact regional stability either toward its edification or 
degradation, a fact which requires policy makers to carefully consider the design of 
airpower security cooperation instruments (particularly FMS). 
 
                                                 
12 Since 1967, the vast majority of Arab negotiating positions with respect to the Israelis call for a 
return to the pre-1967 borders, as called for in U.N. Resolution 242. In contrast, prior to the Israeli military 
victory in 1967, there was little to no acceptance of Israeli borders (or recognition of the Israeli state). 
Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Fifth Edition (Boston: Bedford / St. Martins, 
2005), 217-331.  
13 See Nadav Safran, “Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973,” International Security, 
Vol. 2, No. 2. (Autumn 1977), 133-170; also Youssef Aboul-Enein “The Egyptian-Yemen War (1962-67): 
Egyptian perspectives on Guerrilla warfare,” Infantry Magazine, January 1, 2004; available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-116585276.html (accessed November 1, 2007); also Douglas A. 
Kupersmith, The Failure of Third World Air Power: Iraq and the War with Iran (Maxwell Air Force Base, 
AL: Air University Press, 1993); finally Hussaini, PAF over the Years (Peshawar, Pakistan: PAF Book 
Club, 2002). 
14 Prior to Desert Storm, the Soviets, French, and British shared in exports to the region; in the years 
following, however, U.S. suppliers dominated. Joe Stork, “The Middle East Arms Bazaar After the Gulf 
War,” Middle East Report, No. 197, Vulnerabilities in the Gulf. (November-December 1995), 14-17, 19. 
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Another factor that drives a state to modernize its airpower capabilities is its 
desire to garner prestige in the international system.  Security cooperation provides 
weaker states with a means through which to maintain diplomatic access to the United 
States, whose favor can bode well for their interests on the world stage (in the United 
Nations in particular).  Also, operating and maintaining a modern air force is one mode of 
asserting a state’s legitimacy among regional neighbors.  This “norms and values” model 
is one manner in which to explain why a state like the United Arab Emirates would 
purchase eighty highly advanced F-16s, a force that from the perspective of critics 
appears to unjustly exceed any legitimate security needs (these particular F-16s, the 
Block 60 variant, are more advanced than anything the USAF currently operates).15  It is 
plausible to suggest that there is a certain “keeping up with the Jones” that drives states 
(particularly authoritarian regimes) to seek the “American brand” of defense hardware, 
the crown jewel of which is U.S. fighter aircraft.  This “need for prestige” is one factor 
that facilitates opportunities for the U.S. to influence states via the instrument of airpower 
security cooperation.  
C. SECURITY COOPERATION AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT—
BACKGROUND AND EXISTING ARGUMENTS   
Security cooperation has been a significant policy instrument of the Untied States 
since World War II when President F.D. Roosevelt lent fifty American destroyers to the 
British Royal Navy in return for basing rights.16  It was in the context of the Cold War, 
however, under which various security cooperation instruments were amalgamated under 
the Foreign Cooperation Act of 1961, which in addition to the Arms Export Control Act 
of 1976 continues to provide the legal framework for all security cooperation programs.17 
                                                 
15 “United Arab Emirates - Air Force,” August 2, 2007; available at http://www4.janes.com/ (accessed 
November1, 2007). Also, the “norms and values” model mentioned here is described in Scott Sagan’s 
“Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, 
Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997). 
16 Geoffrey Kemp, “The Continuing Debate over U.S. Arms Sales: Strategic Needs and the Quest for 
Arms Limitations,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 535 (“The Arms 
Trade: Problems and Prospects in the Post-Cold War World,” September 1994), 148. 
17 Duncan L. Clark, Jason D. Ellis, and Daniel B. O’Connnor, Send Guns and Money, Security 
Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Policy, London: Praeger Publishers, 1997, 10. 
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During the Nixon Administration, security cooperation gained primacy as a policy 
instrument in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.  This “Nixon Doctrine” stated that the 
United States would provide military and economic cooperation to allies for problems of 
internal security and national defense so that future U.S. administrations could “avoid 
another war like Vietnam any place in the world.”18  However, debate regarding the 
efficacy of security cooperation programs peaked in response to the outcome of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran, which saw the toppling of a regime that had been a significant 
beneficiary of U.S. security cooperation under the Nixon administration.19  The Carter 
administration’s subsequent attempt to lead the world’s weapons suppliers in restricting 
conventional arms exports was set back by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  
Reversing course altogether, the Reagan and first Bush administrations eschewed notions 
of export restraint and instead advocated increased use of security cooperation programs 
to achieve a variety of U.S. foreign policy objectives.   
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the realities of reduced domestic military 
spending bolstered the impetus for increases in arms exports despite the lack of 
ideological struggle that formerly justified their purpose.  Once again debate ensued, as 
the primary recipients in the export market were the states of the Middle East, consuming 
over 40 percent of the world’s arms in 1991 (an increase from 36 percent in 1981 during 
the height of the Cold War).  Efforts by the first Bush administration to reengage the 
world’s primary arms suppliers (who happened to be the five permanent members of the 
U.N. Security Council) in cooperative restrictions on the proliferation of arms to the 
Middle East proved to be superficial and short lived.20  In fact, to the surprise of many 
the Clinton administration championed arms exports as a means to serve the economic 
interests of the United States by declaring the U.S. government would actively seek 
                                                 
18 William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All: How America’s Multibillion-Dollar Arms Trade Warps 
Our Foreign Policy and Subverts Democracy at Home (New York: Harper Collins, 1995) 22. 
19 Kemp, Ibid., 152-153. 
20 Joe Stork, “The Middle East Arms Bazaar after the Gulf War,” Middle East Report, No. 197 
(Vulnerabilities in the Gulf, November-December 1995), 15-16. 
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foreign buyers for U.S. defense products, thus marking a transition of purpose for 
security cooperation from one of security to one of American economic well-being.21   
Debate regarding Washington’s extensive use of security cooperation programs 
throughout these preceding decades has been generally divided into two schools of 
thought.  Realist thinkers have viewed security cooperation as a viable policy instrument 
through which the state may further its overall national security interests.22  Those with a 
more liberal view of international relations have tended to view security cooperation 
programs as something that discourages trust and cooperation between states; on the 
contrary, they have alleged that such programs engender arms races, destabilization, 
human rights abuses, and conflict.23  Liberal criticism of U.S. security cooperation policy 
was particularly fervent with respect to the trend of increasing arms exports to the Middle 
East region after the 1991 Gulf War, a phenomena that was asserted to be primarily 
driven by corporate greed and defense industry influence rather than foreign policy 
strategy.24  Regardless, while the liberal view gained mild influence during the Carter and 
first Bush administrations, the realist approach towards security cooperation has 
prevailed in the realm of U.S. policy, with the persisting underlying argument being that 
it provides the United States with a measure of influence over the purchasing state. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Michael N. Beard, LtCol, USAF, United States Foreign Military Sales Strategy: Coalition Building 
or Protecting the Defense Industrial Base. Research Report submitted to the Air War College (Air 
University, Maxwell AFB, AL: March 1995) 2. 
22 Kemp, Ibid., 152-154. 
23 Ibid., also Clark, Ellis, and O’Connor define three categories of thought regarding security 
cooperation policy in the post-Cold War period: traditionalists—those who promote the continuation of the 
practice, reformers—those who see value in security cooperation as a policy tool but who also call for more 
prudence with respect to arms exports, and abolitionists—those who see the continued practice of security 
cooperation in the post-Cold War period as unnecessary and immoral. Clark et al., op. cit., 126-134. 
24 See William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All: How America’s Multibillion-Dollar Arms Trade 
Warps Our Foreign Policy and Subverts Democracy at Home, New York: Harper Collins, 1995. Also 
William W. Keller, Arm in Arm: The Political Economy of the Global Arms Trade, New York, 1995, 
Harper Collins. 
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Scholarly examination of the legitimacy of this underlying assertion has led some 
to suggest there are limitations to how much influence the supplier-state can expect to 
gain.25  Keith Krause, arguing from a neo-Marxist paradigm, contended that the 
relationship of the supplier and recipient must be viewed in context to the military 
hierarchy of the broader international structure.  He interestingly noted that Middle 
Eastern states have displayed a desire to reduce their dependency on supplier states by 
intentionally diversifying their purchases among different suppliers despite the inherent 
military inefficiencies associated with such a policy.  As a result, he argues that due to 
supplier competition in the post Cold War period, suppliers have been unable to use arms 
transfers as a means to exert political influence.26   
Another notable contribution yields a similarly cautious conclusion with respect 
to supplier influence.  In his essay “Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the 
U.S. Pakistani Relationship,” T.V. Paul  examined the U.S. security cooperation policy 
with respect to Pakistan and the ensuing proliferation of nuclear weapons to that state, 
and asserted that influence in security cooperation relationships during the Cold War was 
at times a two-way street; in other words, the bipolar international struggle yielded 
opportunities for recipient states to exert their influence onto their suppliers because of 
the latter’s security needs.  He suggested, however, that the end of the Cold War has 
reduced recipient states’ abilities to exert any measure of reverse influence.27  While 
Paul’s compelling argument was limited to a single-case analysis, his theoretical 
assertions nonetheless provide a useful framework for examining influence in the 
supplier-recipient relationships in other cases.   
 
 
                                                 
25 Cristian Catrina, “Main Directions of Research in the Arms Trade,” in “The Arms Trade: Problems 
and Prospects in the in the Post-Cold War World,” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, ed. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
1994, 202. 
26 Keith Krause, Arms and the state: patterns of military production and trade, Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations: 22 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 182-203. 
27 T.V. Paul, “Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S. Pakistani Relationship,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 12 (December 1992), 1078-1092. 
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Overall the preceding three decades have witnessed some comprehensive studies 
on U.S. security cooperation policy and the global trends of arms transfers.  However, 
except for the aforementioned authors, most scholars have focused on aspects of security 
cooperation not directly pertaining to the measurement of supplier-recipient influence.  
Also since September 11, 2001 there has been a relative dearth of scholarly work 
regarding security cooperation policy.  While journalists have recognized that there 
appears to be a renewed “arms bonanza” in the Middle East during the contemporary 
period, the current environments in Iraq and Afghanistan have diverted scholarly 
attention away from the various security cooperation programs in the Middle East.28   
In lieu of the new regional structural context and uncertainties engendered by the 
U.S. occupation of Iraq, sectarian conflict within Iraq, the expansion of Iranian influence, 
and concomitant anxiety of regional actors, the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation 
programs in the region will be of critical importance over the near and long term.  
Unfortunately, there has been no comparative analysis of regional programs that 
identifies factors yielding policy failure or success.  Further, previous analysis has 
focused solely on the arms transfer aspect of security cooperation and has largely 
neglected its other facets such as personnel exchanges and combined training and 
operations.  This thesis intends to fill these gaps and ultimately produce lessons and 
recommendations as to what future airpower security cooperation in Iraq should look 
like.  In general, this thesis finds that airpower security cooperation is best viewed as an 
instrument of realpolitik—one that will be effective in promoting U.S. interests if it 
accounts for Iraq’s principal inter-state security concerns, maintains regional power 
balances at appropriate levels, and imbues a sense of enduring commitment by the U.S.  
With these characteristics, Washington can expect to garner investment returns in the 
form of Baghdad’s cooperation in promoting regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, 
and continued cooperation in the GWOT.  However, toward the objective of democracy 
promotion in Iraq, a pragmatic assessment of the case studies suggests that airpower 
security cooperation will have an uncertain effect. 
                                                 
28 “Security Assistance Bonanza after September 11th,” Middle East Report, No. 222 (Spring 2002), 
11. 
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D. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research focused on U.S airpower security cooperation with Egypt and Pakistan 
to determine to what extent these efforts have produced desired diplomatic policy 
objectives.  These programs take on various forms as they can be comprised of various 
combinations of FMS, FMF, direct commercial sales, International Military Education 
and Training (IMET), combined training and exercises, and in some cases combined 
operations under the guise of multinational coalitions.29    
The thesis seeks to identify the key variables of airpower security cooperation that 
produce intended policy outcomes.  As the emphasis is on airpower security 
cooperation’s utility as an instrument of diplomacy, the thesis mostly examines broad 
factors pertaining to inter-state relationships.  Accordingly, while research included the 
study of various components of security cooperation instruments (such as FMS, FMF, 
IMET, and combined training/operations) analysis is qualitative and does not include 
“number crunching” the levels of funding, force levels, etc.  As for the dependent 
variable “desired policy outcomes” analysis first determines whether or not policy intent 
has been clearly articulated by the Unites States with respect to each case recipient.  Once 
policy intent is resolved, the case studies reveal whether or not the subsequent actions of 
recipient states reflective intended outcomes.  In the contemporary context, analysis 
measures outcomes with respect to U.S. intentions regarding regional stability, nuclear 
non-proliferation, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and democracy promotion.    
The cases of Egypt and Pakistan were chosen because they share the following 
characteristics: they represent major regional actors, are currently defined as major non-
NATO allies, have particular significance among Muslim countries due to their historical 
place in Islam as well as their citizens’ contributions to the ideology of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and are governed by pro-U.S. regimes that currently face significant 
                                                 
29 IMET is conducted solely on a grant basis. FMS can be conducted using host nation funds, donor 
funds or FMF. Website for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/Default.htm (accessed October 28, 2007). Also see Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. 
O’Connnor, and Jason D. Ellis, Send Guns and Money, Security Cooperation and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
London: Praeger Publishers, 1997, 11-13. 
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domestic pressures from Islamist opposition groups.30  Arguably, any future unitary state 
of Iraq will share these characteristics.  These two cases also provide the benefit of 
examining various levels of diplomatic success.  On one end of the spectrum, a 
preliminary view of the program pertaining to Egypt may be judged to have produced 
mostly positive outcomes, while policies with respect to Pakistan have had mixed results.  
These two cases reveal plausible factors of causation that underlie broad generalizations 
regarding policy outcomes.  They also provide some insight as to what characteristics of 
an airpower security cooperation program with Iraq will promote success. 
Sources for research included governmental policy directives and documents, 
governmental reports containing data regarding security cooperation programs (such as 
those provided by the Congressional Research Service, State Department, and Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency), journalistic sources (newspapers and magazines), 
scholarly journals and books, interviews with members of the Office of International 
Affairs under the Secretary of the Air Force, interviews with regional scholars, and 
interviews with USAF exchange officer personnel and foreign air force officers. 
E. THESIS ROADMAP 
The introduction of each chapter provides a short history of U.S. security 
cooperation to the recipient state.  Next, the chapters review the supplier and recipient 
interests pertaining to the region as well as the historic and contemporary impact of 
airpower on the regional strategic calculus.  Following a brief description of security 
cooperation policy, analysis determines whether results met the desired intent.  With 
respect to the contemporary era, policy results are measured with respect to objectives 
regarding regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, diplomatic and military 
cooperation with a focus on the GWOT, and democracy advancement inside the recipient 
state.  The conclusion of each chapter portends lessons pertaining to airpower security 
cooperation with Iraq.   
                                                 
30 Gilles Kepel describes the contributions to the recent rise of political Islam by men such as Egypt’s 
Sayiid Qutb (intellectual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Pakistan’s Malwana Mawdudi (founder of 
Jamaat-e-Islami). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, translated by Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press: 2002) 23-42. 
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Chapter II focuses on two phases of U.S. security cooperation to Pakistan.  First, 
analysis looks at the period of cooperation that was implemented as a response to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a program that ultimately spanned four 
presidential administrations and bore many lessons regarding influence in the supplier-
recipient relationship.  Specifically, this portion of analysis will focus on Pakistan’s 
development of nuclear weapons despite Washington’s policy mandate that Pakistan 
forego nuclear proliferation activities as a precondition for security assistance.  Next, the 
chapter reveals the consequences concomitant with the divorce in the U.S.-Pakistani 
security relationship that resulted after the implementation of Pressler sanctions.  Finally, 
the chapter focuses on the period since 9/11 and U.S. efforts to cajole the Pakistani 
government into cooperation against the Taliban and Al Qaeda factions that operate in 
Afghanistan and within Pakistan.   
Chapter III addresses security cooperation to Egypt that began as an outcome of 
the Camp David accords.  The case suggests that the enduring partnership in security 
cooperation with Egypt has yielded measurable and consistent results.  The Egyptian case 
further suggests that addressing a state’s concerns regarding airpower balance with 
respect to its principal rivalry can foment inter-state regional peace.   
Chapter IV applies lessons from the Pakistani and Egyptian security cooperation 
programs to the prospect of rebuilding the Iraqi Air Force. Analysis examines the 
program in its current state and measure current IqAF capabilities against Iraqi regional 
and domestic security needs.  Most significantly, the chapter predicts the extent to which 
a robust airpower security cooperation program would provide the United States a means 
to exact influence towards the promotion of its regional interests pertaining to regional 
stability, nuclear nonproliferation, cooperation in the GWOT, and democracy 
advancement.  Finally, the concluding chapter recommends policy characteristics 
pertaining to reconstituting the Iraqi Air Force over the next two to three decades. 
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II. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN 
DURING TWO PERIODS:  THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF 
AFGHANISTAN AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States in security 
matters became paramount during two periods: the Soviet invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989 and the U.S. Global War on Terror in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001.  For each period, this chapter presents an overview of 
U.S. and Pakistani interests with respect to the South Asian region and briefly presents 
how airpower plays into the regional strategic calculus.  Next, the objectives of U.S. 
security cooperation programs with Pakistan are assessed against actual outcomes.  For 
the first period, the chapter focuses on Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons 
despite Washington’s condition that security assistance be tied to Pakistan’s abstinence 
from proliferation activities.  For the more recent period, the chapter assesses results 
pertaining to regional stability, nuclear non-proliferation, cooperation in the GWOT, and 
democracy advancement.  The chapter also addresses the intervening era between these 
two periods in order to identify consequences that resulted from the on/off/on-again 
nature of the security relationship between the two states.  Overall, the case of Pakistan 
reveals that the degree of influence afforded by airpower security cooperation has largely 
been determined by the extent to which it facilitated Pakistan’s perception of its own 
regional security vis-à-vis India.  Accordingly, for the case of Pakistan any desired policy 
outcome or measure of influence the United States wishes to exact derives from this key 
variable. 
B. SECURITY COOPERATION DURING THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF 
AFGHANISTAN, 1979-1989 
The mutual defense agreement of 1954 represented the initial amalgamation of 
U.S. and Pakistani interests whereby Pakistan became part of the U.S. Cold War policy of 
containment.  As a benefit of this agreement as well as Pakistan’s willingness to be 
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included in the pro-west South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central 
Treaty Organization, the U.S. provided nearly $2 billion in U.S. assistance to Pakistan 
from 1953 to 1961.  However, in response to the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, 
the U.S. suspended military assistance to Pakistan (and India), commencing what would 
become a pattern of aid provision followed by aid suspension.31 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 altered U.S. interests with 
respect to Pakistan in a monumental fashion.  The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was 
viewed by Washington as a Soviet stepping stone towards controlling the vast oil 
resources of the Persian Gulf.  In conjunction with the recent loss of Iran as a Persian 
Gulf ally concomitant with Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution, the Soviet invasion 
represented a nearly direct threat to national security when viewed in the context of the 
Cold War.32  Accordingly, the Carter and Reagan administrations would wrestle with the 
need to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in confronting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
while simultaneously discouraging Pakistan from developing or obtaining nuclear 
weapons. 
Pakistan’s principal security interest since its inception has been survival against 
its larger and more powerful neighbor India.  The ever-present threat of war with India is 
imbedded in Pakistan’s “strategic culture” for good reason, as the two states fought full-
scale wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 and have engaged in multiple limited conflicts 
since.33  As a result, India’s nuclear testing in 1974 presented Pakistani security planners 
                                                 
31 K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33498. 
Updated August 24, 2007. 10-11. Also, Duncan L. Clark, Daniel B. O’Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, Send 
Guns and Money, Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1997) 38-40.  
32 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York, NY: FREE 
PRESS, 1991) 701. 
33 Krondstadt, op. cit., 10. Also, throughout this thesis, the term “strategic culture” is used in a manner 
best described by Kanti Bajpai: “strategic culture consists of two parts. The first is the central strategic 
paradigm--the basic assumptions about orderliness in the world. Included here are assumptions about the 
role of war in human affairs, about the nature of the adversary, and about the efficacy of the use of force. 
The second part is grand strategy, or the secondary assumptions about operational policy that follow from 
the prior assumptions. These may be gleaned from various texts written over time by statesmen, soldiers, 
scholars, commentators, and diplomats. Kanti Bajpai, “Indian Strategic Culture,” in Strategic Asia 2006: 
Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington D.C: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 246-247. Also, regarding Pakistan’s strategic culture, see the 
chapter in the same text by Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Strategic Culture.” 
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with an untenable security situation whereby Pakistan had to ensure state survival either 
by obtaining their own nuclear deterrence or by gaining the assurances of a formal 
security alliance with a greater power.  The United States however had already gained a 
reputation as an unreliable security partner due to the imposition of sanctions following 
the wars with India in 1965 and 1971 and in response to Pakistan’s alleged attempts to 
obtain nuclear weapons.34  For Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan therefore 
represented both a security threat as well as an opportunity.  The existence of Soviet 
forces on Pakistan’s border required that policymakers entertain the possibility of further 
Soviet expansion into Pakistan.35  On the other hand, Pakistani willingness to counter the 
Soviet presence through its support of the mujahadeen rebels in Afghanistan afforded 
Pakistan a unique opportunity to increase its leverage with respect to the United States. 
C. THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN SOUTH ASIA DURING THE SOVIET 
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN 
Pakistan boasts a professional, competent, and battle tested air force with a proud 
history.  Born as a component of the British Royal Air Force, the independent Pakistani 
Air Force (PAF) first saw action in 1948 conducting logistical and supply missions in 
support of ground forces during operations in Kashmir.  PAF success during the war 
against India in 1965 led historians to refer to that year its “zenith” from which it “could 
justify being its country’s crowning glory.”36  Throughout its air battles with India in 
both the 1965 and 1971 wars the PAF claimed a kill-ratio of three-to-one, a figure 
supported by then U.S. defense representative to Islamabad Brigadier General Chuck 
Yeager.37  Later, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the PAF claimed it shot  
 
                                                 
34 Krondstadt, op. cit. 
35 At the time, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States wrote that the Soviet intervention was a 
“grave and unprecedented act of military aggression” that “flouts all norms of peaceful co-existence and 
principle of sovereignty of states” and stated further that “it is therefore vitally important that U.S. 
commitment to Pakistan's territorial integrity and independence should extend beyond verbal assurances 
and become a credible and durable guarantee.” Sultan Muhammed Khan, “Pakistani Geopolitics: The 
Diplomatic Perspective,” International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Summer 1980), 26-36. 
36 “PAF Kills/Claims—1971 War,” website for the Pakistani Military Consortium, available at 
http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/airforce/ (accessed August 28, 2007). 
37 Ibid. 
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down eight Soviet fighters for intrusions into Pakistani airspace.  Pakistani pilots also saw 
action outside the region by serving with other states’ air forces in the Arab-Israeli wars 
of 1967 and 1971 as well as the Yemeni Civil War in 1969.38 
As a result of these conflicts, the PAF imbued a perceived measure of prestige 
onto the Pakistani state.  Bolstering this sense of pride was the belief that the PAF 
enjoyed a qualitative advantage due to the fact that it operated western military hardware 
as compared to the Soviet-supplied Indian Air Force (IAF).39  The PAF’s first year as the 
benefactor of U.S. security assistance in 1957 was described as “momentous” because of 
the delivery of 100 F-86 Sabre jet fighters as well as an eventual procurement of B-57 
light bombers and F-10 Starfighters.40  This same pride was raised to new levels by the 
purchase of F-16 fighters that came about due to U.S.-Pakistani security cooperation 
during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; inevitably, this airpower-induced euphoria 
would make the sting of sanctions stopping delivery of these F-16s all the more caustic 
when Washington elected to use airpower security cooperation in a coercive manner.41 
D. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION DURING THE SOVIET 
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN: F-16S, NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION, AND THE PRESSLER SANCTIONS 
As a result of the Carter administration’s desires to curb global arms transfers and 
concerns regarding Pakistan’s alleged desire to obtain nuclear weapons, Congress passed 
the Glenn and Symington amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act which disallowed 
arms transfers to states that were suspected to be developing nuclear weapons, thus 
                                                 
38 Performance of Pakistani pilots in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 prompted the Chief of Staff of the 
Israeli Air Force to remark that he was glad that Air Marshal Noor Khan (then commander of the PAF) was 
not his Egyptian counterpart. “Pakistan Air Force,” article available at 
http://www.geocities.com/Baja/Dunes/1107/HTML/paf/war.htm?200728 (accessed August 28, 2007). 
39 Feroz Khan, Brigadier Pakistani Army, retired (Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Department of National Security Affairs). Interview by author, August 28, 2007. 
40 “Pakistani Air Force—Yesterday and Today,” website for the Pakistani Military Consortium, 
http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/airforce/ (accessed August 28, 2007). 
41 Feroz Khan, op. cit. 
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forbidding military aid to Pakistan.42  However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
engendered a policy reversal in the Carter administration such that it sought to strengthen 
Pakistan’s self-defense capability in response to the Soviet threat through the provision of 
aid: “we will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan 
defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from 
the north.”43  Toward that end, the administration offered a package amounting to $400 
million in military and economic aid over two years as well as a re-affirmation of the 
1959 security cooperation agreement.  
In response to both the amount of aid and Carter’s refusal to include the sale of 
highly desired F-16s as part of the offer, President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq scoffed that 
the deal amounted to “peanuts” considering both the severity of the Soviet threat and the 
degree to which the United States needed Pakistan’s cooperation: “you take Pakistan out 
of the region, and you will find that you have not one inch of soil where America can 
have influence—right from Turkey down to Vietnam.”44  President Zia correctly 
presumed that Pakistan would benefit from the Reagan electoral victory in 1980, as his 
administration returned to the practice of overtly promoting security assistance as a viable 
means to contain the “Evil Empire.”  Reagan’s Secretary of State Alexander Haig soon 
offered a deal to Pakistan worth $3.2 billion over five years, the purpose of which was to 
give “Pakistan confidence in our commitment to its security and provide us with 
reciprocal benefits in terms of our regional interests.”45   
                                                 
42 Carter declared via Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13) that arms transfers were an “exceptional” tool 
of foreign policy, and that the U.S. would “not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly 
developed weapon systems which would create new or significantly higher combat capability.” Duncan L. 
Clark, Daniel B. O’Connor, and Jason D. Ellis. Send Guns and Money, Security Assistance and U.S. 
Foreign Policy. (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1997) 65-66. Also, The Glenn and Symington Amendments to the 
Foreign Assistance Act “specifically forbade U.S. aid to countries that transfer to, or receive from other 
nations plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment equipment, materials, or technology that is not 
under international safeguards.” T.V. Paul, “Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S. 
Pakistani Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 12 (December 1992), 1087. Also see Krondstadt, Ibid., 
8. 
43 Dennis Kux. The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001) 247. 
44 Ibid., 248-251. Also Paul, op. cit., 1083, 1085. 
45 Comment made by Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Nicholas Veliotes. See 
Kux, op. cit., 256. 
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As part of the new aid offer, the Reagan administration requested a waiver to the 
Symington and Glenn amendments in order to include the sale of F-16s to the Pakistanis.  
The argument in favor of the sale was that Zia’s cooperation for the CIA’s covert 
operations in Afghanistan was a crucial element of national security strategy, as Pakistan 
was deemed to be a “front line state” in the policy of containment.46  Also, the argument 
for the sale contained an element of nuclear non-proliferation—the concept was that 
adequate security assistance can “assuage perceptions of security that drive states to go 
nuclear.”47  The Pakistani’s rhetoric implicitly supported the concept that the F-16s 
would promote non-proliferation, arguing that by modernizing the air force they could 
leverage their overall conventional capability giving them what they perceived to be “a 
slight edge over India and what forces are in Afghanistan” as well as a “long-term, cost-
effective deterrent capability.”48  A congressional study on the F-16 sale agreed, stating 
that any alteration of the sale would “result in Pakistan’s reviewing its relationship with 
the United States, propelling it toward a nuclear explosion...”49   
Congress was not convinced that the security assistance package would obviate 
Pakistan’s desire for nuclear weapons and as a result passed the Pressler Amendment to 
the Foreign Assistance Act in order to compensate for the loss of non-proliferation 
measures of the now-defunct Symington amendment.  This latest measure required the 
President to annually certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon before the 
United States would provide any form of military aid.50 
During the latter portion of the Reagan administration U.S. intelligence 
discovered Pakistani uranium enrichment activities and alleged plots to smuggle nuclear-
related materials from the United States.  In accordance with the Pressler Amendment, 
                                                 
46 Clark et al., op. cit., 75. Also William D. Hartung. And Weapons for All: How America’s 
Multibillion-Dollar Arms Trade Warps Our Foreign Policy and Subverts Democracy at Home (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1994). 100. Also, for a thorough analysis of CIA-Pakistani ISI cooperation and 
involvement in Afghanistan, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and 
Bin Ladin, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Group, 2004). 
47 Kux, op. cit., 260. 
48 Ibid. Emphasis added by author. 
49 Paul, op. cit., 1086. 
50 Clarke et al., op. cit., 111. 
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aid was stopped for a short six-week period; however, the Reagan administration and pro-
aid lobby eventually pushed through Congress a bill that extended the level of aid to $4 
billion over six additional years, arguing that terminating aid ran counter to the strategic 
interests of the United States and served to destabilize to the region.  By this time, aid 
proponents also expressed the opinion that terminating the aid would not keep Pakistan 
from going nuclear.51 
It was not until 1990 during the George H.W. Bush administration that U.S. 
intelligence agencies unanimously concluded that Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb.  
Purporting to be constrained by the Pressler Amendment, President Bush made the 
continued provision of aid illegal.  All aspects of the security assistance package were 
stopped immediately.  Most notably and particularly troubling to Pakistan, twenty-eight 
new F-16s went into storage in the United States instead of being delivered to Pakistan.52   
Overall, the Pakistani response to implementation of sanctions under the Pressler 
amendment could be characterized as “disbelief, shock, and anger.”53  The Pakistani 
press characterized the aid stoppage as unfair and anti-Islamic, and was quick to note that 
while Pakistan had not yet even tested its weapons capability, India had actually exploded 
one in 1974 and was not punished as severely.  The pervading perception was that 
because the Soviets had recently withdrawn from Afghanistan, the United States no 
longer valued its relationship with Pakistan and was therefore acting in a manner that 
facilitated its reputation as a fickle strategic partner. 54 
The Bush and Clinton administrations both continued attempts to use the 
undelivered F-16s as an instrument of diplomatic leverage.  Initially, U.S. demands were 
that Pakistan roll-back their nuclear program and verifiably destroy the existing cores.  
                                                 
51 While the aid package was before Congress, Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan stated that 
Pakistan had a nuclear weapons “capability.” Paul, op. cit., 1088-89. Also Kux, op. cit., 308. 
52 Officials in the Defense Department, having developed significant military-to-military relationships 
with their Pakistani counterparts, convinced the Pakistanis that they should continue to pay the U.S. 
contractor for the undelivered fighter jets so that they might improve their chances of receiving them once 
diplomacy rectified the current impasse. Perhaps believing that the precedence of short-lived aid stoppages 
would apply in this case, the Pakistanis agreed to continue payments. Paul, op. cit., 1090.  
53 Kux, op. cit., 310. 
54 Ibid. 
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Later, these demands evolved to Pakistan freezing its nuclear program and allowing 
“non-intrusive” inspections.  Islamabad insisted, however, that it would not entertain any 
degree of non-proliferation unless India would reciprocate in kind.  Reflecting the mood 
of Pakistan’s security planners, Army Chief of Staff General Abdul Waheed expressed a 
more candid position, stating that the Pakistani military would not “bargain away 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme for F-16s or anything else.” 55  Ultimately, the issue was 
resolved without any non-proliferation measures being considered…no inspections, no 
destruction of weapons components, and certainly no roll-back.   
After a decade and a half, Pakistan received billions of dollars in economic and 
military assistance, obtained some of the F-16 fighter aircraft they had purchased while 
being reimbursed for the costs those undelivered, and most significantly developed a 
nuclear weapons capability (ironically for which the primary delivery platform would be 
the F-16s).  The end result begs the question of “who influenced whom” with respect to 
the proliferation issue. 
E. ASSESSING INFLUENCE:  THE F-16 DEAL AND NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION 
The results of airpower security cooperation with Pakistan (specifically the FMS 
of F-16s) during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan produce mixed results.  When 
measured against the intent of dissuading Pakistani development of nuclear weapons, the 
program failed altogether.  However, if measured as a component of the overall strategic 
objective of expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan, one can legitimately claim that the 
policy contributed to a successful outcome.  Analyzing the causes of these disparate 
outcomes yields lessons regarding to what extent the United States can expect to use 
FMS of airpower assets to influence recipients.   
                                                 
55 After the Pressler sanctions were invoked, Prime Minister Bhutto expressed Pakistan’s confusion 
over the American policy, stating that the U.S. position had changed from one of “stay where you are” to 
“roll back your program.” Later during the Clinton administration, Prime Minister Nawaz threatened legal 
action regarding the undelivered F-16s, resulting in the Clinton administration offering to repay 70 percent 
of the cost outright, with the other 30 percent being paid through donated wheat and other commodities. At 
this point the F-16 deal was essentially closed. Ibid., 310, 326-327. 
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One question that must be answered is whether or not policy intent with respect to 
nuclear proliferation was clearly communicated by Washington and correctly received by 
Islamabad.  The language of the Pressler amendment simply stated that aid to Pakistan 
was contingent upon Pakistan not possessing “a nuclear explosive device.”56 In retrospect 
it is evident that the Pakistanis believed they had some leeway to conduct some 
proliferation activities short of possessing a nuclear explosive device considering the fact 
that the U.S. President controlled certification of Pakistani compliance.  Based upon 
comments later made by senior Pakistani government officials after the implementation 
of the Pressler sanctions, they believed they had been given a green light from the Reagan 
administration to proceed with development of their nuclear weapons program; as long as 
their activities remained sufficiently “in bounds” the assumption was that the F-16 
deliveries would not be jeopardized.  Subsequent statements by Reagan administration 
officials support such a message being sent.57 
Actions by the Reagan administration certainly supported a perception of 
executive influence over the implementation of the Pressler amendment.  When Reagan 
appealed to Zia to reduce the level of uranium enrichment to that which was 
commensurate with civilian-only energy use, intelligence confirmed that no reduction in 
enrichment activities followed.  Despite this information, the administration failed to 
invoke sanctions and instead presented a larger aid package to Congress than the one 
preceding it.58  Thus it appears that the policy intent of the F-16 FMS with respect to 
                                                 
56 U.S. Department of State. “Sanctions on India and Pakistan,” fact sheet, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/5101.htm (accessed September 19, 2007). 
57 Zia’s negotiators initially made it clear that they would not compromise their nuclear development; 
Secretary of State Haig’s response was that the nuclear issue should not obstruct the U.S.-Pakistani 
relationship Comment made by Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia Nicholas 
Veliotes. Kux, Ibid., 256, 260. Also, Assistant Secretary of State Jane Coon subsequently stated that there 
was a tacit understanding during the Reagan administration that they would tolerate Pakistan possessing a 
bomb, as long as they did not explode one (conduct a test). Kux, op. cit., 257. Finally, it is interesting to 
note that some Reagan administration officials believed that Carter’s restrictions on arms transfers 
fomented Pakistan’s desire for a nuclear deterrence and that despite public statements to the contrary a 
Pakistani nuclear weapons capability might actually serve U.S. interests in the region Paul, op. cit., 1088. 
58 Paul, op. cit., 1088. Also, Pakistani officials argued that they had not actually violated Pressler, as 
they had merely declared a nuclear weapons capability…which does not necessarily equate to possession 
of a nuclear explosive device. To the layman this nuance in terms may seem trivial, but when taking into 
account the alleged message of “tacit approval” established by the Reagan administration, Pakistani shock 
at the implementation of sanctions appears to be consistent with such a message being given. Kux, op. cit., 
314. 
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non-proliferation was somewhat muddled by the disparity between the executive branch’s 
message versus that put forth by Congress.  Such message variations regarding policy 
intent challenge any attempts to assess outcomes.  In this particular case, however, 
analyzing the U.S and Pakistani security relationship through a lens of realpolitik 
elucidates the outcome despite the muddled policy message.  
First, Pakistan’s quest to develop a nuclear weapon was undoubtedly driven by 
their overriding strategic culture…survival of the state.  The reality of India possessing a 
nuclear capability presented Pakistan with an untenable situation with respect to its 
national security.  In retrospect it would appear dubious to argue that bolstering 
Pakistan’s conventional defenses with military aid, to include the F-16s, would dissuade 
them from developing a truly viable deterrent to India’s nuclear capability without the 
benefit of a formal security guarantee.  From this perspective, Pakistan’s nuclear 
development in spite of the Pressler amendment was a predictable outcome and casts 
doubt as to whether or not airpower security cooperation can realistically dissuade states 
from attempting to acquire a nuclear deterrent, particularly when survival of the state is 
perceived to be at stake and a sufficiently strong alliance cannot be obtained. 
Second, the Bush administration’s refusal to certify Pakistani nonproliferation 
cooperation came amidst the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.  It was the Soviet 
threat that propelled the Carter administration (and to a much greater extent the Reagan 
administration) to seek Pakistani cooperation in supplying the mujahideen in Afghanistan 
via the $4 billion security assistance package.  Once the threat of Soviet influence in the 
region was gone, Washington reassessed its need for maintaining its special relationship 
with Pakistan.  From this perspective, the security assistance package and sale of F-16s in 
particular represented a reward for Pakistani cooperation in a matter that served U.S. 
interests—countering the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf by supporting the jihad in 
Afghanistan.59  For the immediate benefit of U.S. interests, terminating the security  
 
 
                                                 
59 Paul, op. cit., 1091.  
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relationship with Pakistan appeared to be the rational choice.  With the benefit of 
hindsight however, the next section reveals that deleterious consequences clearly 
resulted. 
F. FALLOUT FROM PRESSLER AND THE SEVERED SECURITY 
RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN 
The Pressler sanctions and hasty termination of security cooperation between the 
United States and Pakistan did not bode well for U.S. interests and regional security in 
South Asia over the ensuing decade.  First, the lesson learned by the PAF regarding the 
sanctions was that it could no longer afford to become dependent on a sole supplier, 
meaning that even if the U.S. once again offered FMS to Pakistan it would still seek to 
diversify sources of supply despite any inefficiencies associated with such a policy.60  
For example, to compensate for the undelivered F-16s and loss of spare parts, the PAF 
acquired F-7 tactical aircraft from China and later looked to Sweden to acquire an aircraft 
platform for the airborne-early-warning-and-control (AWACS) mission.61   
Second, the severed relationship and loss of F-16s decreased Pakistan’s self-
perception of its security vis-à-vis India.  As a result, Pakistan sought to bolster its 
nascent nuclear capability with ballistic missiles using technology garnered from North 
Korea to supplement ongoing missile acquisition efforts from China.62  Cooperation with 
North Korea began in 1993 but became public in 1998, when Pakistan tested its Ghauri 
missile—essentially a renamed North Korean No-Dong missile.  Analysts suspect that the 
missile technology from North Korea was granted in return for Pakistan’s knowledge 
                                                 
60 Wing Commander Syed Zaidi, PAF. Interview by author, August 28, 2007. 
61 Hussaini, PAF over the Years (Peshawar, Pakistan: PAF Book Club, 2002). 107. Information also 
obtained from Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-South Asia, “PROCUREMENT, Pakistan.” Available 
at http://jmsa.manes.com. Date posted: 13 June 2007 (accessed August 20, 2007). 
62 According to Professor Feroz Khan, the entire transfer of No-Dong missile technology costs 
Pakistan less than $100 million. Comments made at the Naval Postgraduate School, August 27, 2007. Also, 
Pakistan likely turned to North Korea because of waning Chinese assistance in their missile development 
programs. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenal: Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Threat. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2005) 250-252. 
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regarding gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment technology.63  The missile test further 
strained the U.S.-Pakistani relationship as the U.S. imposed additional sanctions via the 
Missile Technology Control Regime.64   
Third, the Pressler sanctions severed U.S.-Pakistani military-to-military 
relationships that had been cultivated over time, although some contacts were 
periodically facilitated through international peace-keeping operations.65  The IMET 
program that brings foreign officers to U.S. military schools was thereafter denied to 
Pakistan, the result of which was that “Pakistan low and mid-level military officers are no 
longer ‘westward looking’…and the U.S. military lost the opportunity to appreciate and 
understand the ethos, capabilities, orientation, and competence of the Pakistani 
military.”66  According to a panel of U.S. flag-rank officers, “the lack of such relations 
with Pakistan during the 1990s…showed their consequences in the immediate aftermath 
of September 11” when the United States once again sought Pakistani cooperation.67 
Finally and most disconcerting, the intervening years between the Pressler 
sanctions and September 11, 2001 were plagued by multiple crises between Pakistan and 
India that in one case brought both parties to nuclear brinkmanship that culminated in 
overt nuclear weapons testing by both sides in 1998.  Causes of these conflicts were 
                                                 
63 Cirincione, et al., op. cit., 252. Also, “In late 2003…inspections in Iran and a decision by Libya in 
December to renounce its WMD programs provided evidence that Pakistani scientists had supplied nuclear 
technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistani officials denied any government knowledge of such 
cooperation and at first, denied that A.Q. Khan (former head of Khan Research Laboratories) and his 
associates had assisted Libya or North Korea. Khan confessed to his proliferation misdeeds in early 
February 2004 and was pardoned by President Musharraf immediately…It was not until President 
Musharraf published his memoirs in September 2006 that he admitted nuclear technology had been sold to 
North Korea.” Sharon A. Squassoni, WMD Trade between North Korea and Pakistan, CRS Report for 
Congress, Order Code RL31900, November 28, 2006, 2. 
64 Cirincione et al., op. cit., 252. 
65 Pakistan’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping provided a conduit for U.S.-Pakistani 
military contact outside of normal channels. In some instances Pakistan was allowed to obtain parts for 
sustaining military equipment despite sanctions: “for example on August 13, 2001, President Bush granted 
a one-time waiver of sanctions that permitted the spare parts sales for Pakistan’s Cobra helicopters and 
armored personnel carriers as well as ammunition to support Pakistan’s contribution to peacekeeping 
activities in Sierra Leone.” C. Christine Fair. The Counterterror Coalitions; Cooperation with Pakistan and 
India. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Cooperation, 2004) 12-13. 
66 Ibid., 12.  
67 Michael R. Chambers, “U.S. Military Perspectives on Regional Security in South Asia,” in South 
Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliance, ed. Michael R. Chambers (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 
War College Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002) 231-232. 
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complex, but a continuing grievance of India was that Islamabad was guilty of fomenting 
Islamic militancy in the Kashmir region that resulted in as many as 66,000 lives lost since 
1989.  In more recent years India also blamed Pakistan for terrorist attacks inside India.68  
Some scholars allege these activities were part of Pakistan’s desire for “strategic depth” 
with respect to India, a policy that promoted asymmetric strategies to counter the Indian 
conventional advantage and which may have led Islamabad to initially support the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan.69   
It would be a stretch to claim that the Pressler and subsequent sanctions were the 
preponderant factor in Pakistan’s use of asymmetric methods to counter Indian military 
superiority in South Asia during the 1990s.  Rather, it is more accurate to state that 
Pakistani disappointment over its severed security relationship with the U.S. and growing 
disparity of its airpower capabilities lent to its overall sense of insecurity with respect to 
India, the outcome of which were security policies that engendered regional instability 
and countered U.S. interests.  The doldrums of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship in the years 
following Pressler would change abruptly because of the events of September 11, 2001, 
after which Washington would once again seek Pakistan’s assistance in implementing its 
security strategies.70 
                                                 
68 Kronstadt, op. cit., 10-11. Also, Fair, op. cit., 7. 
69 Fair describes Pakistan’s use of militants as part in asymmetric strategies: “while all evidence 
suggests that Musharraf is not and indeed has not been favorable inclined toward the ethos of the militant 
groups and their destructive influence upon the social fabric of Pakistan and its political and economic 
development, groups operating in Indian-held Kashmir and within India proper have long been considered 
a ‘strategic reserve.’ Pakistan views these individuals as a relatively inexpensive way of tying up hundreds 
of thousands of Indian security forces in the counterinsurgency grid.” Fair, op. cit., 25. Also, Vali Nasr 
explains Pakistani support for the Taliban: “The military, initially ideologically opposed to the Taliban, 
came to see an added benefit to this change. It allowed the military, which was gradually becoming more 
secular, to be more Islamically effective without becoming any more Islamic itself. This became most clear 
during General Parvez Musharraf’s command of the army and later control of Pakistan.” Vali Nasr, 
“Islamic Extremism and Regional Conflict in South Asia,” in Prospects for Peace in South Asia, ed. Rafiq 
Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 29. Finally, according to 
Professor Feroz Khan, Pakistan eventually abandoned asymmetric strategies because the Pakistani 
government’s attempts at co-opting militant forces to counter India ultimately caused domestic problems 
that outweighed any strategic gain vis-à-vis India. Interview conducted by the author on August 28, 2007. 
70 Prior to 9/11 Pakistan faced further sanctions because of its nuclear testing of 1998 and the military 
coup that brought President Musharaff to power in 1999. Kronstadt, op. cit., 12-13. 
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G. SECURITY COOPERATION SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
In the days immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Washington and 
Islamabad rapidly progressed toward unprecedented cooperation whereby substantial 
provisions of military and economic aid garnered the U.S. limited basing rights, access to 
Pakistani airspace by U.S. combat aircraft, and the Pakistani government’s direct efforts 
in countering extremists inside Afghanistan and within its own borders.71  Concerns 
persist however regarding Pakistan’s role in regional and global terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, conflict with India and concomitant regional instability, as well as the lack 
of progress toward democratization under the Musharraf regime. The question is: how 
does airpower security cooperation play into what has or has not been successful in 
achieving U.S. policy objectives in Pakistan since 9/11?   
The following sections make the case that the U.S. airpower security cooperation 
bolsters Pakistan’s perception of its national security and as a result has contributed to 
regional stability as evidenced by diplomatic détente with India and to a lesser extent a 
strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation measures.  Most notably security cooperation 
has garnered Pakistan’s consistent cooperation in the GWOT.  However, results thus far 
suggest that military instruments of security cooperation are not well suited to objectives 
of facilitating the growth of democratic institutions inside Pakistan.  Rather, such intent 
requires the additional implementation of other policy instruments. 
H. CONTEMPORARY U.S. AND PAKISTANI INTERESTS AND 
CONCERNS 
In contrast to previous eras of U.S-Pakistani security cooperation, Washington 
must now carefully weigh Pakistan’s status as a bona fide nuclear weapons state and the 
probability that any development that decreases regional instability also raises the 
                                                 
71 According to President Musharraf, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage issued 
ultimatums consistent with the new Bush policy of “you’re either with us or against us,” threatening that a 
failure to ally with the United States in its War on Terror would subject Pakistan to intense bombing. 
“Musharaff says U.S. threatened to bomb Pakistan,” International Herald Tribune. September 22, 2006. 
Available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/22/news/web.0922pakistan.php (accessed September 19, 
2007). 
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prospect of nuclear war.72  The ongoing dispute with India over Kashmir in particular is a 
“tinder box” issue over which the positions of the United States and Islamabad diverge 
due to allegations that Pakistan facilitates low-intensity conflict in that region in order to 
expend India’s conventional military resources.  If true these activities counter U.S. 
desires for stability in South Asia and contradict U.S. denunciation of Islamic militancy 
and terrorism.  The United States also continues to be concerned about the potential for 
the proliferation of nuclear technology from Pakistan to other non-nuclear states that 
many analysts believe occurred with respect to Libya, North Korea, and Iran via the A.Q. 
Khan nuclear black-market network.73 
The nuclear dimension also raises the level of angst regarding internal stability in 
Pakistan, which has recently been impacted by power struggles between the Musharraf 
regime, the Pakistani Supreme Court, and opposition parties to the ruling regime.  Far 
more troubling is what appears to be a significant rise in Islamic militancy as evidenced 
by increasing numbers of incidents of suicide bombers and the recent Lal Mosque 
Crisis.74  The potential ascension to power of Islamic extremists and concomitant access 
to nuclear weapons represents a “nightmare scenario” from the perspective of U.S. 
policymakers.75  
Finally, Washington is concerned over what intelligence suggests is an Al-Qaeda 
safe-haven in western Pakistan.  Relations have been strained due to allegations in 
Washington that Musharraf has pursued a “policy of appeasement” towards extremists in 
the western tribal areas.  Tensions have worsened because of statements by various U.S. 
officials that Washington should consider taking unilateral action inside Pakistan against 
“actionable targets,” a suggestion that has engendered outrage among Pakistani security 
officials.76   
                                                 
72 Pakistan and India have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Cirincione et al., 
Ibid., 27-28.  
73 Howard B. Schaffer. “U.S. Interests in South Asia,” in Prospects for Peace in South Asia, ed. Rafiq 
Dossani and Henry S. Rowen. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 335-339. 
74 Kronstadt, op. cit., 28. 
75 Schaffer, op. cit., 337.  
76 Krondstadt, op. cit., 2, 16-17. 
 30
For Pakistan, the 9/11 events represented an opportunity to once again increase its 
leverage with the United States and concomitantly to enhance its status in the 
international system.  Pakistani policies prior to 9/11—support for the Taliban, 
indigenous nuclear development and testing, horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
technology and delivery systems, support for militancy in Kashmir, and the incursion in 
Kargil— partially isolated it from the international community.77  Pakistani moderates 
desire to garner prestige in the Muslim world by facilitating an image as a secular state 
that enjoys a functional democratic government—a “modern state for Muslims.”78  This 
ideal is currently being challenged by more fundamental Islamic political currents 
promoting governance according to Shariah law.  Moderates in Pakistan view its 
relationship with the United States and status in the international community as essential 
to helping them confront the Islamist domestic political challenge.79  Pakistanis remain 
skeptical however, about the longevity of U.S. partnership based upon pervasive distrust 
of U.S. intentions and staying power.  Fears persist that in the future the U.S. will make a 
hasty departure from the region as it did in 1989 after which Pakistan was left to deal 
with the flood of the Afghan jihadis, resulting in law enforcement problems that 
overwhelmed its infrastructural and bureaucratic capacity.80 
Ultimately, Pakistan views all regional security issues in the context of its 
ongoing struggle with India.  For example, Islamabad suspects that Indian diplomatic 
activity in Afghanistan amounts to an Indian policy of “strategic encirclement.”81  More 
importantly, Pakistanis view with great skepticism the recent overtures between the 
United States and India towards establishing a strategic partnership, the mark of which 
includes the sharing of nuclear technology for civilian use as well as bilateral military 
                                                 
77 Fair, op. cit., 55-56. 
78 Ibid., 56. 
79 Chambers, op. cit., 233. 
80 Fair, op. cit., 54-55 
81 India has opened numerous consulates in Afghanistan since 2001. Kronstadt, op. cit., 13. 
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exercises.82 Accordingly while elements of U.S. security cooperation are routinely 
advertised as having a purpose overtly pertaining to U.S. interests in fighting the GWOT, 
Pakistan weighs such elements as either enhancing or detracting from its own strategic 
position vis-à-vis India.  This is certainly true regarding Pakistan’s view of conventional 
balance of power vis-à-vis India and its renewed opportunity to purchase U.S. military 
hardware, especially advanced fighter aircraft.  
I. CONTEMPORARY AIRPOWER IMBALANCE IN SOUTH ASIA 
The airpower picture in South Asia can best be characterized as one of imbalance 
in favor of India, a trend that will only worsen over the next decade if India’s air force 
modernization efforts continue without a reciprocal effort on behalf of the Pakistanis.83  
India maintains a quantitative and qualitative airpower advantage over Pakistan with 
exclusive capabilities that include aerial refueling and beyond-visual-range air-to-air 
missiles.  India’s fleet of fighters are more numerous and more capable (Su-30 vs. F-
16A), leading many to predict that in the event of full-scale conventional war India would 
quickly establish air superiority.  Accordingly many analysts suggest that this increases 
the chance of nuclear war because of Pakistani assessments that the PAF would be unable 
to defend its nuclear ballistic missile sites.  Indeed, heavy losses by the PAF are one of 
the unofficial thresholds put forth by Pakistani security officials that would compel 
Pakistan to use nuclear weapons against India.84    
A persistent overall conventional military imbalance could also encourage 
Pakistani security planners to once again advocate asymmetric means to counter India’s 
conventional advantage, such as renewed support of anti-India militant groups in 
Kashmir.  Similar strategies in the past have proven to destabilize the region and have 
facilitated an increase in Islamic extremist political forces inside Pakistan.85 
                                                 
82 Fair, op. cit., 54-61. Also, according to a PAF officer, USAF and IAF Cope India air-to-air exercises 
are viewed by the PAF as a disparity in U.S. diplomatic favor towards India. Interview with Wing 
Commander Syed Zaidi (PAF); conducted by the author on August 28, 2007. 
83 Gill, op. cit., 255-256. 
84 Cirincione et al., op. cit., 247. 
85 Gill, op. cit., 253-254. 
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J. CONTEMPORARY AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH 
PAKISTAN 
Pakistan is currently among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid and the 
third highest recipient of security assistance behind Israel and Egypt, receiving about $3.2 
billion for the four fiscal years spanning 2002-2006, an amount that includes more than 
$1.2 billion in security-assistance.86  According to the State Department’s most recent 
budget request for foreign assistance to Pakistan, the policy seeks to maintain “Pakistan’s 
support in the Global War on Terror and efforts to build positive relations with its 
neighbors, India and Afghanistan.”87  In addition, the strategy is to “encourage Pakistan’s 
participation in international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
and support in the development of a moderate, democratic, and civilian government...”88   
Security assistance components of the State Department’s strategy are designed to 
continue “force modernization and traditional defense capabilities.”  Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) measures are to enhance border security, counterterrorism capabilities, 
and force modernization through equipment upgrades and acquisitions as well as the 
renewal of the flow of parts supply to maintain U.S. equipment purchased prior to the 
Pressler sanctions.  The strategy emphasizes that “this will have a direct impact on the 
war on terrorism and will enhance U.S. Pakistani interoperability.”89  Security assistance 
also employs IMET also to “raise the quality and professionalism of officers by focusing 
on defense management, civilian control of the military, human rights, and the rule of 
law.”90  Noticeably absent throughout the State Department’s strategy for security 
cooperation is any reference to Pakistan’s conventional military strength vis-à-vis India. 
                                                 
86 Pakistan also has since 2001 received some $5 billion in reimbursements for its support of U.S.-led 
counterterrorism operations. U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification: FOREIGN 
OPERATIONS., Fiscal Year 2008. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84462.pdf (accessed 
November 27, 2007) 564. Also Kronstadt, op. cit., from “Summary” (no page number given). 
87 The Department of State. Congressional…, op. cit. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. Also, in order to provide aid to Pakistan for its cooperation in the GWOT, the U.S. government 
waived the Glenn-Symington Amendment sanctions that forbid U.S. security assistance to regimes that 
obtained power via military coup, Fair, op. cit., 15. 
90 The Department of State. United States Foreign Assistance…, op. cit. 
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As a result of the renewed opportunity to acquire U.S. military hardware, Pakistan 
is undergoing aggressive attempts to modernize its air force by upgrading its existing 
fleet of F-16s and by acquiring new models.  Recently the Pakistani Cabinet approved the 
purchase of 26 older F-16 A/B models and 18 new F-16 C/D Block 52s.  In addition, the 
F-16 purchase may include up to 500 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air 
Missiles (AMRAAM) and 500 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).91   
The addition of these munitions in conjunction with upgrades to the existing F-16 
fleet and the new Block 52 F-16s would provide a monumental increase in capability to 
the PAF.  The AMRAAM would provide the PAF its first beyond-visual-range (BVR) 
shoot-down air-to-air missile, a capability that India already possesses. This importance 
of this capability cannot be underestimated; an air force lacking a modern BVR capability 
that must confront an air force possessing a BVR capability faces extremely disturbing 
odds—survival is dubious, and air superiority for the latter almost guaranteed.92    
The GPS-assisted, inertially-guided JDAM would provide the PAF with a 
precision-ground-munition to attack fixed targets.  Coupled with the BLU-109 the JDAM 
can penetrate hardened targets such as bunkered command and control facilities.  
Precision is an airpower force-multiplier that enhances strategic efficiency and economy 
of forces by reducing the number of sorties required to achieve target destruction.   
Hypothetically for example, a target that requires eight aircraft sorties to achieve a 
desired probability of destruction with unguided munitions might only require one sortie 
with precision munitions.  JDAM is most effectively used against fixed targets for which 
intelligence may provide a pre-known target location to a specific degree of accuracy.  
However, the planned purchase of the SNIPER advanced targeting pod with the fleet of 
new F-16s represents a sensor-weapon combination that provides a potential capability  
 
                                                 
91 Kronstadt, op. cit., 25. Also, The 26 aircraft of older F-16s are reportedly to come from the original 
fleet of those that were previously purchased but never delivered because of sanctions invoked under the 
Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The U.S. Navy has operated some of these aircraft in 
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for flexible, real-time precision targeting.93  These advanced weapon systems would do 
much to decrease any qualitative gap between the PAF and IAF, but are not sufficient to 
eliminate the overall airpower advantage currently enjoyed by India.94 
In addition to FMS and FMF programs, the U.S. has reinitiated IMET and intra-
theater air force cooperation efforts.95  As these programs are ongoing, policy outcomes 
are evolving; however, one may assess what the U.S. has obtained in response to 
airpower security cooperation thus far and whether or not results have met U.S. 
intentions.  The following sections assess results with respect to the policy intentions of 
maintaining Pakistan’s cooperation toward the promotion of regional stability, nuclear 
non-proliferation, the GWOT, and democracy advancement in Pakistan. 
K. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: REGIONAL STABILITY    
The United States renewed security relationship with Pakistan following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks was timely as subsequent events would call for U.S. 
diplomatic intervention to reduce regional tension.  Following the terrorist attacks on the 
Indian Parliament in December 2001, much of 2002 was spent by both sides on military 
buildups and nuclear brinkmanship fomented by the respective leaders’ vitriolic rhetoric.  
Multiple visits by U.S. diplomats were credited with gaining Islamabad’s cooperation in 
banning militant operations in Pakistani controlled areas of Kashmir, a development that 
allowed a return to diplomacy between Pakistan and India and helped to avert war 
between India and Pakistan in 2002.96  Since Pakistan initiated a cease-fire agreement in  
 
                                                 
93 Source is the author’s own expertise in F-16 weapons systems and tactical employment. 
94 In the Pentagon’s overt assessment, the provision of these advanced weapon systems to the PAF 
would not significantly alter the airpower qualitative and quantitative advantage enjoyed by the IAF, nor 
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Muhahideen activities in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and barred the leader of outlawed Jaish-e-
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October 2003, it has taken overt steps to improve bilateral relations, reduce tensions, and 
increase confidence building measures including travel and commerce across the 
Kashmiri line-of-control and as well as increases in bilateral trade.97 
The trend towards improved bilateral relations between India and Pakistan has 
recently survived terrorist events that have derailed such efforts in the past, suggesting 
that current progress towards a lasting peace has substantial momentum.  Musharraf and 
his Indian counterparts have found a manner in which to facilitate cooperation in 
response to terrorism through the creation of a “joint terrorism network,” whereby 
Pakistani and Indian officials agree to meet quarterly to share information garnered from 
investigations into terrorist incidents and as well as any information that can be used to 
prevent terrorist attacks.  The new framework for cooperation was tested in February 
2007 when two bombs exploded on an Indian passenger train killing 68 people; days after 
the two foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process despite such 
efforts to ruin it.98 
The increase in bilateral contacts and measures to improve relations have thus far 
avoided the contentious subject of Kashmir, which the Pakistanis continue to contend 
represents a “freedom struggle” in contrast to India’s view that unrest in the region 
amounts to illegitimate militant activities and acts of terrorism.  However, the increase in 
engagement between the two sides recently led their respective foreign ministers to 
remark that they conducted “the most sustained and intensive dialogue” to date regarding 
the Kashmir problem.99 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Krondstadt, op. cit., 48. 
98 In 2006, despite a cessation of foreign secretary-level talks following the July terrorist bombings in 
Bombay, President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced resumption of formal peace 
negotiations and the creation of a “joint anti-terrorism mechanism.” Kronstadt, op. cit., 14. 
99 Kronstadt, op. cit., 15. 
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Finally, the renewed U.S.-Pakistani security relationship has been followed by 
efforts to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war in South Asia.  Islamabad has begun to 
work with New Delhi to prevent accidental nuclear war by implementing measures such 
the establishment of a hot-line between the two states’ foreign ministers and extending 
the moratorium on nuclear testing.100   
In sum there is substantial, measurable evidence of progress toward improved 
bilateral relations between Pakistan and India, all of which have occurred since the 
rebirth of U.S-Pakistani security cooperation.  While one cannot contend that security 
cooperation is responsible for the reduction in tensions, trends in South Asia suggest a 
correlation between the two; rather it is more appropriate to suggest that security 
cooperation programs, particularly the airpower components, leverage Pakistan’s 
perception of its security vis-à-vis India and provide it with a strengthened negotiating 
position.  However, despite these positive trends territorial disputes remain capable of 
instigating a return to conflict and instability.  A return to asymmetric strategies by 
Pakistan (all of which previously occurred during an era of non-cooperation with the 
U.S.) would derail what progress has been achieved so far.  Continued U.S. airpower 
security cooperation encourages Pakistan to stay on the current course of continuous 
improvement in bilateral relations with India.  The next section addresses a matter that 
affects stability beyond South Asia—the potential for horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
technology, and whether or not airpower security cooperation with Pakistan has produced 
any positive trends regarding this key security concern. 
L. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
With respect to Pakistan, U.S. concerns for the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) are primarily aimed at the state’s nuclear technologies.  Pakistan is 
not known to possess biological or chemical weapons and has ratified both the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.101  In lieu of 
                                                 
100 Circione et al., op. cit. 
101 Squassoni, op. cit., 4. Also, “there is some concern that it [Pakistan] is conducting a limited 
chemical weapons research program.” Ciricione et al., op. cit., 240. 
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the nuclear tests of 1998, the potential for a Pakistan-India nuclear arms race was 
formerly the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia.  Since 9/11 however 
Washington has been more concerned by evidence of transfer of Pakistani nuclear 
technologies and materials to third parties including North Korea, Iran, and Libya.102  
The prospect of a non-NATO ally proliferating technology to the principal 
members of the “axis of evil” is indeed disturbing.  Revelations regarding the A.Q. Khan 
network prompted Washington to impose sanctions directly onto the Khan Research 
Laboratories (notably, as opposed to the Pakistani government) from March 2003 to 
March 2005.103  The U.N. Security Council also responded by passing Resolution 1540 
requiring states to criminalize trade activities related to proliferation.    
In an effort to restore its standing in the international community amid revelations 
of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market, Pakistan passed increasingly stringent export 
legislation five times from 1998 to 2004, the latest of which was designed to close 
previously established loopholes that gave the military certain exemptions.  However, the 
question remains as to whether or not government has the intention or even the capacity 
to enforce the laws.104  The question of succession to the Musharraf regime ensures that 
the issue of who controls Pakistan’s nuclear technologies will remain a central focus of 
U.S. policymakers and proliferation watchdogs. 
Despite these overt attempts to assuage U.S. proliferation concerns, suspicions 
persist regarding Pakistan’s relationship with North Korea under Musharraf.  According 
to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, there is a lack of hard evidence  
 
 
 
                                                 
102 Kronstadt, op. cit., from “Summary” (no page number given). 
103 Squassoni, op. cit., 3. 
104 The latest version of export legislation “prohibits the diversion of controlled goods and 
technologies, including reexport, transshipment, and transit; requires licensing and record keeping; 
establishes export control lists and penal provisions of up to fourteen years of imprisonment and a fine of 
PRs 5 million (about $86,500).” The law applies to every Pakistani national at home or abroad as well as 
foreign nationals inside Pakistan. Cirincione et al., op. cit., 249-250. 
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regarding Pakistan’s assistance to North Korea’s nuclear weapons development; 
however, there are multiple reports suggesting that Pakistan assisted North Korea in 
obtaining centrifuge rotors.105   
Unfortunately, renewed security cooperation efforts cannot “undo” the horizontal 
proliferation activities that emanated from within Pakistan, as the foundations for 
proliferation via the A.Q. Khan network were already in place by the time Washington 
renewed its relationship to Pakistan in response to September 11th.  However, airpower 
security cooperation is a viable instrument to address the elements of Pakistan’s strategic 
culture that brought about its efforts to obtain a nuclear deterrent in the first place—its 
security vis-à-vis India.  In addition, it also provides the U.S. access to those residing at 
the center of Pakistan’s strategic culture—the military leaders responsible for making 
Pakistan’s security choices.  While none of these benefits of airpower security 
cooperation can safely predict the extent to which Pakistan cooperates in nuclear non-
proliferation, the previous era of non-cooperation with Pakistan suggests that 
Washington’s failure to comprehend the importance of airpower assets to its strategic 
culture contributed to the horizontal proliferation of nuclear technologies.  The next 
section addresses an area of cooperation that has fortunately yielded more tangible 
results. 
M. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: PAKISTANI COOPERATION IN THE GWOT 
Pakistan’s cooperation in the U.S. led GWOT represented an immediate 
manifestation of bilateral security cooperation following 9/11, as President Musharraf 
offered the support of Pakistani intelligence services, access to Pakistani airspace by U.S. 
                                                 
105 “Apparently, North Korea attempted to obtain materials from China, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and 
Europe, but Pakistan provided most of the assistance related to the [centrifuge] rotors. A Pakistani official 
involved in Khan’s investigation reportedly said North Korea ordered P-1 centrifuge components from 
1997 to 2000. The scope of Pakistan’s cooperation with Libya and Iran (including P-1 and P-2 designs, a 
nuclear weapon design for Libya, and some complete rotor assemblies) raises significant questions about 
how much other help Khan might have given to the North Koreans. In his September 2006 memoir, 
Pakistani President Musharraf stated that he believes that Khan sent some of ‘Pakistan’s most 
technologically advanced nuclear centrifuges.’” Squassoni, op. cit., 7. Also, Islamabad has reportedly not 
allowed U.S. access to interview of A.Q. Khan and has since declared its own investigation of the A.Q. 
Khan nuclear black market “closed.” Given the lack of attention of the Bush administration to the purported 
lack of access to A.Q. Khan leaves some analysts to entertain the prospect that the U.S. has in fact had 
access, and that public denials to the contrary are designed to provide political support to Musharraf. 
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combat aircraft, and logistical support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan.  Throughout 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Pakistan provided its support “without any of the 
formal agreements or user fees that are normally required for such privileges.”106 
Pakistani contributions to U.S. military operations during OEF have been 
extensive.  According to briefings given by CENTCOM personnel, by 2002 Pakistan had 
already contributed 35,000 army personnel for internal security and operations support 
and another 7000 personnel from the air force.  The PAF also deployed radars and moved 
two squadrons in support of U.S. Forward Operating Bases and activated three additional 
bases.  Perhaps most significant was that two-thirds of Pakistan’s airspace was made 
available for the transit of U.S. combat sorties into Afghanistan, resulting in 28,000 
sorties from Oct 1, 2001 to March 7, 2002, allowing for persistent air cover over 
Afghanistan in support of ground forces engaging the Taliban and elements of Al-
Qaeda.107 
Access to Pakistani bases have been critical to logistical support for operations in 
Afghanistan, providing operating locations for over 50 aircraft and 2000 military 
personnel.  Bases included four areas used for intermediate staging, two of which hosted 
Predator UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) operations that journalists allege were used to 
assassinate members of Al-Qaeda inside Pakistani territory.108  Logistical support at 
these locations included Pakistan’s provision of 10,000 gallons of fuel for daily air 
operations.  In addition, Pakistani security forces sufficiently protected coalition forces 
such that there were no successful terrorist attacks made against them inside Pakistan.109   
One of the most significant contributions of Pakistan to the GWOT is their 
capacity to provide human intelligence (HUMINT), providing an “important complement 
to U.S. technical and other means of intelligence collection,” the impact of which not 
only aids the mission in Afghanistan but also enables Pakistani and U.S. military and law 
                                                 
106 Fair, op. cit., 13, 15. 
107 Also, Pakistani maritime cooperation has, according to CENTOM, assisted the U.S. Navy in 
providing “freedom of operations within areas proximate to Pakistan.” Fair, Ibid., 27-28, 31. 
108 Kronstadt, op. cit., 15. 
109 There have been some attacks against American civilians in Pakistan, but thus far none against 
U.S. military forces have been successful. Fair, Ibid., 28. 
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enforcement officials to conduct “direct, low profile efforts…in tracking and 
apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory.”110  As of 
2002, Pakistani authorities remanded to U.S. custody approximately 500 such fugitives 
including key Al Qaeda key members such as Abu Zabaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid 
Sheik Mohammed, and Abu Faraj al-Libbi.111 
Pakistan’s direct participation in the GWOT has not been without costs.  In 
autumn of 2003, Musharraf sent 25,000 armed forces personnel into the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Afghan border to confront pro-Taliban 
militants; in the two Wazirstan areas in particular fighting between Pakistani armed 
forces and militants resulted in more than 800 deaths of Islamic extremists in addition to 
600-700 Pakistani troops.112  Hundreds of civilians were reportedly caught in the 
crossfire as well, an unintended outcome that complicated efforts to sway domestic 
opinion away from sympathy for Islamic pro-Taliban militants in the FATA.  In what 
many suggests represented a stark example of the government’s limited capacity to 
effectively counter pro-Taliban militants in the FATA, Islamabad later shifted to a 
strategy of reconciliation with the pro-Taliban militants, a policy that immediately 
engendered disappointment and skepticism in the United States and has since been 
judged “to have failed in its central purposes” and to have “inadvertently allowed foreign 
(largely Arab) militants to obtain safe haven from which they can plot and train for 
terrorist attacks against U.S. and other Western targets.”113  Thus, while by in large 
Pakistan has delivered much in response to Washington’s security cooperation 
investments since 9/11, these machinations of strategies in the FATA indicate the 
difficulty with which Islamabad must confront domestic currents of Islamic militancy in 
Pakistani society and alludes to a limited capacity of security cooperation to shape such 
domestic trends, and concomitantly to advance democracy in this difficult setting.  
                                                 
110 Fair, op. cit., 32. , Kronstadt, op. cit., 15. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Kronstadt, op. cit., 17-18. 
113 Kronstadt, op. cit., from “Summary” (no page number given), also 16-17. 
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N. ASSESSING INFLUENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
The desire to facilitate democracy in Pakistan is perhaps the most challenging 
outcome to achieve via instruments of security cooperation.  The legitimacy of the 
Pakistani government has been challenged by a perception that the domination of the 
military in domestic politics has led to enduring instabilities in the government.  Indeed, 
Pakistan has more often been ruled by military than civilian regimes and in the two 
instances when a civilian government amassed enough power to amend the constitution, 
military coups immediately followed.  Perceptions pertaining to the current regime are no 
different, as political observers both inside and outside Pakistan criticize an apparent 
concentration of power in the presidency that is supported by the military and intelligence 
institutions.  Critics also suggest that appointments of military officers to high-level 
leadership positions undermine the independency of civilian institutions.114   
In a political trend that mirrors those throughout Muslim countries, the groups 
that have the greatest capacity to challenge the Musharraf regime are Islamists.  A recent 
election resulted in significant gains by the United Action Front (a coalition of six Islamic 
parties) in which they won eleven percent of the popular vote and about one-fifth of the 
seats in the National Assembly.115  Political Islam’s more violent manifestations in 
Pakistan have resulted in multiple assassination attempts on President Musharraf, 
increasing numbers of suicide bombers, and the highly public and violent confrontation 
of Islamic extremists with the Pakistani military at the Lal Mosque.116   
A common thread throughout Islamist movements is disdain for U.S. foreign 
policies which are thought to be inherently anti-Islamic.  However, it is unfortunate for 
both the United States and Pakistani moderates that perceptions regarding U.S. foreign 
policy are not confined to the more extreme end of the political spectrum, but rather 
                                                 
114 Charles H. Kennedy, “Constitutional and Political Change in Pakistan: The Military-Governance 
Paradigm,” in Prospects for Peace in South Asia, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2005) 37-45. 
115 Local government has also witnessed Islamist influence; for example, the North West Frontier 
Province provincial assembly recently passed a bill which calls for the implementation of Shariah law, 
although this was later struck down by the Pakistani Supreme Court.. Kronstadt, op. cit., 32. 
116 Kronstadt, op. cit., 23-27. 
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represent the majority opinion, or as Musharraf himself expressed: “the man on the street 
does not have a good opinion of the United States.”117  Public poling data published by 
the University of Maryland supports this assertion:   
• 67% of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the United States; 
• 73% think weakening and dividing the Islamic world is a policy objective 
of the United States; 
• 54% agree strongly with the goal of requiring strict application of Sharia 
law in every Islamic country.118   
These societal perceptions adversely affect Washington’s ability to market its agenda in 
the region as representing something that benefits its inhabitants.  It also complicates 
matters for the Musharraf regime, which through its cooperation with the United States is 
subject to being viewed as one that cows to U.S. interests over the interests of Pakistan, a 
perception that plays into the rhetoric of Islamist propaganda. 
Despite these limitations, the fact remains that the military holds measurable 
influence in Pakistani politics and security cooperation grants the United States influence 
with those who are close to power.  More simply, the U.S. is better positioned to forward 
its immediate interests with those who have the capacity to do so.  This is not to say that 
efforts to shape society via education reform, economic growth, and political 
liberalization are not important; rather, they are…and may well represent the solution to a 
larger root cause of current ideological battles in Muslim countries.  The capacity of 
security cooperation programs to address these problems is merely limited, and may in 
fact exacerbate anti-U.S. perceptions if the ruling regime is also unpopular.  Attempts to 
shape societal political forces and promoting democracy and human rights are, therefore, 
                                                 
117 Kronstadt, op. cit., 37. 
118 Musharraf alluded that negative perceptions of the United States were wrought from a belief that 
Pakistan had been “left high and dry” after serving as a strategic U.S. ally during the 1980s Afghan war. 
Ibid., 37-38. 
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better left to other policy instruments.119  Rather, military instruments of security 
cooperation are better suited to forwarding U.S. security interests in South Asia, 
bolstering the security interests of Pakistan vis-à-vis India, maintaining an appropriate 
balance of power, and enhancing Pakistan’s status in the international system.  
O. CONCLUSION  
The foregoing analysis of U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan since the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan yields salient lessons regarding policy outcomes with respect to 
expectations as well as factors that contribute to, or detract from, the congruence of the 
two.  First, the period of assistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan reveals 
that influence is not an exclusive right of the supplier; rather, the recipient can exact a 
measure of “reverse-influence” over its provider under circumstances whereby the 
recipient’s cooperation is deemed to be critical to the provider’s national security.120  
This outcome was evidenced by Pakistan’s successful development of nuclear weapons 
program despite U.S. stipulations mandating otherwise.  The Reagan administration’s 
temporary stoppage of aid was short-lived because such a measure was deemed to detract 
from U.S. interests in the region as long as the Soviets were still in Afghanistan.  In 
contrast, President Bush’s decision to not certify Pakistan’s compliance with nuclear 
abstinence was made after the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan.  Simply put, the 
Pakistanis were better able to get what they wanted while the United States had no other 
alternative but to seek Pakistan’s cooperation in countering the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan.    
                                                 
119 While the preponderance of assistance dollars to Pakistan has been oriented towards security 
cooperation and assistance, the United States has embarked on a comprehensive approach towards aid to 
Pakistan and particularly emphasizes support for educational reform to counter the influence of the 
madrassahs. Current State Department budget requests reflect “a commitment to provide $600 million in 
economic and security assistance and $50 million in earthquake reconstruction assistance on an annual 
basis through FY2009.” The objective is that “U.S. assistance will encourage Pakistan’s participation in 
international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and support in the development 
of a moderate, democratic, and civilian government which promotes respect for human rights and 
participation of its citizens in government and society.” The Department of State. Congressional…, op. cit., 
1081. 
120 T.V. Paul offers a concise model that explains the phenomena of reverse-influence through arms 
transfers. Paul, op. cit. 
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Second, with respect to proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Pakistan case 
suggests that security cooperation pertaining to the modernization of conventional forces 
such as F-16 fighter aircraft may be insufficient to ameliorate a state’s security concerns 
such that they are dissuaded from “going nuclear.”  In retrospect, U.S. policymakers were 
perhaps naïve to expect Pakistan to not pursue nuclear weapons development given the 
paradigm of Pakistan’s strategic culture, one that perceives survival of the state as the 
paramount concern, and what amounted to an untenable situation whereby the principle 
threat to their national security had become a nuclear power.  Without a formal alliance 
or security guarantee with another power to counter the Indian nuclear threat, Islamabad 
chose to develop its own nuclear deterrence.  
Third, attempts at using U.S. security cooperation as a coercive instrument via 
sanctions imposed by Congress under the Pressler Amendment, while well intended and 
appearing to promote U.S. interests, yielded outcomes that ultimately countered U.S. 
interests in the intervening years between the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
September 11, 2001.  The loss of the F-16 deal in particular diminished the relative 
airpower parity vis-à-vis India that Pakistan once enjoyed such that India now holds a 
clear quantitative and qualitative advantage.  As a result Pakistan looked to China to 
bolster its airpower needs—a development that furthered Chinese influence in the region.  
The disparate airpower imbalance also led Pakistan to rely further on its nuclear 
deterrent, a policy that manifested the sharing of nuclear technologies with North Korea 
in return for a ballistic missile capability.  The airpower disparity also increases the 
likelihood that Pakistan would use its nuclear forces in the event of full-scale war with 
India because of a fear of losing its nuclear sites to IAF attack. 
The era of security non-cooperation also witnessed Pakistan electing to counter 
India’s quantitative and qualitative military advantage with asymmetric means that 
included subversion and insurgency in Kashmir, the outcome of which was regional 
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instability marked by multiple flashpoints that threatened full scale war and the 
increasing influence of Islamic militants in Pakistani politics.121   
Finally, the imposition of sanctions severed military-to-military relationships that 
had developed over the preceding decade, effectively eliminating a conduit for U.S. 
access to the only institution in Pakistan that has maintained persistent influence on 
political affairs.  The loss of the military cooperative relationship was also an issue that 
challenged U.S. operational efforts in the region immediately after September 11, 2001.  
Since September 11, 2001 outcomes that resulted from the renewed security 
relationship can so far be described as having met the intent of obtaining comprehensive 
Pakistani cooperation with Washington’s GWOT.  Regarding Pakistan’s end of the deal, 
U.S. security assistance is addressing some of Pakistan’s conventional airpower concerns.  
However, the prospect for larger airpower FMS deals with India continue to imbue a 
belief among Pakistan’s security apparatus that the U.S. has adopted an “India first” 
strategy in the region, a perception that threatens to once again detract from Pakistan’s 
assessment of its national security.    
The effect of the renewed security relationship with Pakistan on nuclear 
proliferation potential has yet to be determined.  However, Pakistan has responded to 
U.S. and international pressure by passing anti-proliferation legislation; whether or not 
the state has the capacity to enforce the measures is yet to be seen, but U.S. security 
cooperation provides a means to remain engaged with the Pakistani government and 
increases opportunities for awareness of any unwarranted proliferation activities.   
The contemporary case of Pakistan suggests that airpower security cooperation is 
most effective in bolstering inter-state security with respect to India, garner cooperation 
for U.S military operations, maintain a persistent political influence through military-to-
military relationships, and afford Islamabad leverage in the international system via its 
                                                 
121 Regarding the latter, the perception in Pakistan persists that when the Soviets left Afghanistan, the 
United States left Pakistan to deal with the presence of Islamic jihadists who for a time served 
Washington’s purposes. Their regional presence, in conjunction with the loss of the United States as a 
security partner and the concomitant feeling of insecurity vis-à-vis India, engendered Islamabad’s co-opting 
of Islamic militants as an instrument to occupy the Indian armed forces--thereby shoring up the national 
security of the Pakistani state. Feroz Khan, lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, August 2007. 
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relationship with the United States.  Other U.S. agendas related to the promotion of 
democratic institutions, liberalizing civil society, and facilitating economic growth are 
best left to other policy instruments.  Recent legislation in Washington that makes aid to 
Pakistan conditional upon Presidential certification of its cooperation in the GWOT 
harkens back to the Pressler Amendment and engenders assertions that the United States 
will cease to be a strategic partner once its regional objectives are met.122  Returning to a 
status where there is little-to-no engagement is no longer rational given Pakistan’s 
proliferation potential as well as the possibility that any “regime change” in Pakistan 
might empower political actors whose intentions reflect a radical Islamist agenda.123  The 
next chapter studies the case of U.S. airpower security cooperation with Egypt that 
relative to the Pakistani case has been marked by greater consistency over time and on 
the surface appears to have produced positive policy results. 
 
                                                 
122 During an unannounced visit to Islamabad in February 2007, Vice President Dick Cheney 
reportedly warned President Musharraf that a Democratic-party controlled Congress might cut off aid to 
Pakistan unless they take more aggressive action to counter Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements on Pakistani 
soil. Recently, this verbal threat manifested into legislative reality when Congress passed a bill stating that 
future remittances of U.S. aid to Pakistan would only be granted once the President certified that Pakistan is 
sufficiently targeting “militant training camps, arresting leaders and halting cross border attacks, as well as 
implementation of democratic reforms.” To Pakistanis in government and in the populace at large, the bill 
harkens back to the ill-will begotten by the Pressler amendment, prodding Foreign Ministry spokesman to 
state that “such linkage did not serve the interest of bilateral cooperation in the past and it can prove to be 
detrimental in the future.” “Pakistan objects to U.S. aid bill,” gulfnews.com, available at 
http://archive.gulfnews.com/ariticles/07/07/29/10142738.html (accessed August 12, 2007). 
123 Fair describes the potential consequences: “one potential post-Musharraf future for Pakistan is a 
state that has become wary of the United States, vexed with India, and marginalized once again on the 
world stage. Such a Pakistan may become recalcitrant and actively support militancy and other 
manifestations of terrorism while taking cover under its nuclear umbrella.” Fair, op. cit., 54-55. 
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III. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH EGYPT—
ENDURING COMMITMENT YIELDS SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION    
Since the 1978 Camp David Accords engineered peace between Egypt and Israel, 
the United States has provided an annual average of $2 billion in security assistance to 
Egypt, making it second only to Israel in the amount of military aid granted to any 
state.124  U.S. security cooperation was a key component of the watershed agreement and 
marked an abrupt transition for the Egyptian armed forces which had been primarily 
supplied with Soviet hardware.  Through the provision of modern airpower assets in 
particular, Washington designed a specific regional balance of power that provided Egypt 
with a sufficient conventional deterrence to Israeli aggression while still maintaining a 
qualitative advantage for the Israeli forces. The question is, with regard to the high cost 
of this program to the American taxpayer, what has the United States gained through its 
substantial investment in Egyptian security?125   
This chapter presents an overview of U.S. and Egyptian interests with respect to 
the Middle East region and briefly presents how airpower plays into the regional strategic 
calculus.  Next, the objectives of airpower security cooperation programs with Egypt are 
assessed against actual outcomes pertaining to regional stability, nuclear non-
proliferation, the GWOT and other forms of military cooperation, and democracy 
advancement inside Egypt.  The case of Egypt reveals that the enduring relationship in 
                                                 
124 Jeremy M. Sharp, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 
RL3303, updated June 14, 2006, 1. 
125 Egypt’s “switch” from a Soviet client state to a U.S. client state from the perspective of arms sales 
benefited the U.S. in the context of the Cold War. The new U.S-Egyptian relationship became particularly 
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communist elements in Afghanistan. For a Soviet view of Cold-War arms transfers, see Andrei v. 
Shoumikhin, “Soviet Policy toward Arms Transfers to the Middle East” in Arms Control and Weapons 
Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia, ed. Shelly A. Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1992) 221-227. 
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airpower security cooperation has largely been a success story—one that has resulted in 
outcomes favorable to the U.S.  However, the one exception is that airpower security 
cooperation has not yet facilitated democracy promotion in Egypt, a result which alludes 
to the limited capacity of this policy instrument to contribute to this unique objective. 
B. U.S. AND EGYPTIAN REGIONAL INTERESTS 
Egypt’s diplomatic cooperation is a linchpin of U.S. foreign policy in the region.  
The United States cherishes Cairo’s voice of moderation among Arab states, especially 
with respect to the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict.  The U.S counts on Egypt to use its 
formal peace with Israel as an instrument to facilitate dialogue between the various 
factions pertaining to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian issue.  The security relationship with 
the most populous and powerful Arab state affords Washington a degree of influence in 
the broader Middle East, especially among the members of the Arab League (for which 
Egypt is the host nation).  Specifically, the U.S. views Egyptian participation in the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime as being essential to preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons in the Middle East.  For its GWOT efforts the U.S. expects Egypt’s cooperation 
in facilitating U.S. military operations in the region and also expects the government to 
counter terrorist-leaning elements within Egyptian society.  In aggregate the U.S. desires 
its policies in Egypt to promote economic liberalization, greater democracy, and 
transparent and accountable government.  As a policy instrument the U.S. expects 
airpower security cooperation to continue garnering Egypt’s cooperation in these 
areas.126 
Egypt’s security relationship with the United States has not come without costs, 
the first and most evident of which was Sadat’s assassination by disgruntled Islamists.  
Peace with Israel engendered regional consequences as well, as Egypt was ostracized 
diplomatically from other Arab states and expelled from the Arab League from 1979 until 
                                                 
126 Sharp, Egypt: Background…, op. cit., from “Summary” (no page number given). Also see U.S. 
State Department, “Foreign Policy Objectives—Near East Region,” available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74685.htm (accessed September 24, 2007). 
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1989.127  Domestically, wide-spread perceptions that U.S. policies facilitate Israeli 
“oppression” towards the Palestinians injustice on behalf of the Palestinian peoples 
makes the Mubarak regime’s diplomatic alignment with the U.S. unpopular.   
In lieu of these costs, Egypt has its own expectations regarding security 
cooperation with the United States.  Cairo has persistently sought an as-yet-unattained 
bilateral free trade agreement with the U.S. as part of its efforts to enact liberal economic 
reforms.128  With regard to U.S. calls for political liberalization, the Mubarak regime 
views criticism as particularly irksome given the realities of Islamists’ challenges to his 
regime’s legitimacy.  On the nuclear proliferation front, Egypt would like to see U.S. 
policies that promote the legitimacy and prestige of the non-proliferation regime; Egypt 
expects that regional bad-actors will not get away with illegitimate proliferation activity.  
Its foremost concern, however, is that it expects aid to continue uninterrupted so that it 
can maintain a palatable military balance towards Israel.129  This last expectation alludes 
to the significance of airpower in the region considering its role in shaping recent events. 
C. THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
Airpower has been a significant factor in shaping the regional interstate 
geopolitical power structure.  The 1967 Arab-Israeli war in particular showcased the 
ability of airpower to affect strategic outcomes when the Israeli Air Force’s preemptive 
attack destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground.  Israeli air superiority left 
                                                 
127 Iran’s successes in its war with Iraq gave Gulf states impetus to bolster their security; “as such, the 
1987 Arab League resolution allowing the restoration of relations with Egypt was seen as a direct 
tradeoff—Egypt would put its military weight behind the Gulf States in return for the economic assistance 
that Cairo needed from the oil producers.” As a result Egypt regained full membership in 1989. “External 
Affairs-Egypt,” Jane’s Defense Weekly http://jmsa.com/JDIC/JMSA (accessed September 26, 2007). 
128 While the bilateral trade agreement has not been achieved, the State Department’s policy toward 
Egypt states that the U.S. remains committed to the goal of achieving a bilateral free trade agreement. U.S. 
Department of State, Congressional…, op. cit., 483. Economic liberalization has been part of Egypt’s 
strategic culture since Anwar Sadat came to power. He believed that his predecessor had left Egypt 
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Money, and Power (New York, Free Press, 1992) 593. 
129 Mubarak responded to recent threats by the U.S. Congress to make aid to Egypt contingent upon 
democratization progress by entertaining other military suppliers. Alon Ben-David, “U.S. votes to withhold 
military aid until Egypt instigates reforms,” Jane’s Defense Weekly. July 4, 2007. Available at 
http://jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA/ (accessed September 26, 2007).  
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assaulting Arab ground forces vulnerable to undeterred attack by the IAF that after six 
days resulted in a resounding and humiliating military defeat of the Arab armies through 
which Israel doubled the territory under its control including the Sinai Peninsula.  The 
political fallout engendered by the defeat and occupation of Egyptian territory by Israeli 
forces brought about the demise of President Nasser’s grand ideology of pan-Arabism 
and left Arab regimes in the region scrambling for legitimacy.   
The impact of airpower in 1967 was not lost on Anwar Sadat, whose respect for 
the Israeli Air Force led him to mandate in his 1973 October War that the Egyptian army 
not advance beyond the protection of Egyptian air defenses.  This strategy underscored 
the degree to which Egypt’s perception of its security vis-à-vis Israel was and remains 
directly related to its ability to counter Israeli airpower.130  Accordingly, Sadat and his 
successor Hosni Mubarak have emphasized modernization of the Egyptian Air Force 
through acquisition of U.S. airpower weapon systems and doctrines in order to maintain 
an overall suitable balance of power. 
D. AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH EGYPT 
According to State Department documents, U.S. security assistance is a tool 
whose purpose “will continue to support a modern, well-trained Egyptian military” that 
helps “to ensure stability in the Middle East and North Africa” and strives “to achieve 
interoperability with U.S. forces.”131  Toward that end, the Bush administration requested 
$1.3 billion in FMF for Egypt in FY 2007, continuing the practice of making Egypt 
second only to Israel in the amount of aid granted.132  To date Egypt has purchased 220 
F-16 aircraft, 36 Apache helicopters, and the Patriot air defense system, each of which 
includes follow-on contracts for training and maintenance.  The F-16 represents the core 
                                                 
130 The Egyptian air defense umbrella was comprised of Soviet supplied surface-to-air missile 
systems. Advancing beyond the protection of these systems was unnecessary because of Sadat’s limited 
military objectives that entailed pushing Israeli forces from the Sinai. Sadat’s military objectives were 
designed to strengthen Egypt’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the Israelis. William L. Cleveland, A History 
of the Modern Middle East: Third Edition (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 2004) 375-376. 
131 Emphasis added. U.S. Department of State, “Egypt: Security Assistance.” Available at 
http://state.gov/t/pm/64696.htm (accessed September 24, 2007). 
132 Since the Camp David Accords, the U.S. has consistently provided Egypt with half of the amount 
of aid granted to Israel. Sharp, Egypt: Background…, op. cit., 27. 
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of Egyptian airpower modernization and includes acquisition of 24 Block 40/42 F-16s 
that are capable of employing precision air-to-ground weaponry.  Air Force 
modernization has also included advanced E-2C early warning aircraft that are 
interoperable with U.S. command and control systems.  Other airpower enhancements 
increases Egypt’s air defense capabilities and include U.S. I-HAWK and U.S. Patriot air 
missile systems, the same systems used by the U.S. army for theater air defense.  While 
current funding pays for existing cash obligations and support these existing programs, 
Egypt has expressed interest in acquiring new, more advanced F-16s or perhaps the F-35 
joint strike fighter once it becomes operational and available for export.133 
The other notable characteristic of U.S. security cooperation with Egypt is the 
extensive military-to-military contacts that are made possible by $1.2 million for IMET 
in FY2007, under which Egyptian officers participate in a wide range of educational 
opportunities at U.S. service war colleges, command and staff colleges, as well as officer 
and non-commissioned officer entry-level courses.134  U.S. and Egyptian military 
personnel also participate in joint training activities such as the USAF provision of F-16 
Weapons School instructors to the Egyptian Air Force’s Weapons School (their advanced 
tactical aviation school).135  Also, Egypt hosts the biannual Brightstar exercise focusing 
on large-scale employment of combined arms that in 2005 included the participation of 
9000 U.S. servicemen.136 
To date, U.S. security cooperation with Egypt has continued uninterrupted since 
the signing of the Camp David accords, resulting in an enduring security relationship that 
has spanned five different presidential administrations.  Recently, however, 
                                                 
133 In another massive acquisition program Egypt acquired 880 M-1 A1 Abrams tanks. Ibid; Egypt 
also receives “hundreds of millions” of dollars worth of excess defense articles. U.S. Department of State, 
“Egypt: Security Assistance.” http://state.gov/t/pm/64696.htm (accessed September 24, 2007). 
134 U.S. Department of State, “Egypt…” op. cit. 
135 Major Scott Arbogast, F-16 pilot in the D.C. Air National Guard and former exchange officer to 
the Egyptian Air Force. Interview by the author via e-mail, 30 October 2007. 
136 During the late 90s Brightstar involved 66,000 personnel from eleven countries. The U.S. 
cancelled its participation in 2003 due to GWOT commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, but resumed 
participation in 2005 with 9000 U.S. servicemen participating. Sharp, op. cit., 26; also Hillel Frisch, “Guns 
and Butter in the Egyptian Army,” in Armed Forces in the Middle East; Politics and Strategy, edited by 
Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keany (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002) 101. 
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Congressional concerns regarding a perceived lack of progress towards greater 
democratization in Egypt has resulted in measures that if passed would make the 
remittance of aid contingent upon the U.S. Secretary of State’s verification of sufficient 
Egyptian progress towards greater democratization.137  Congressional inquiries into what 
exactly the United States gains from its investment in Egypt is certainly warranted 
considering the size of the investment and  State Department claims that “the U.S. 
receives a range of strategic benefits from security assistance to Egypt, particularly in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East.”138  The following 
sections catalog the extent to which airpower security cooperation with Egypt is 
producing the desired results with respect to the regional stability, nuclear proliferation, 
the GWOT, and democracy advancement. 
E. ASSESSING INFLUENCE—REGIONAL STABILITY 
Security cooperation with Egypt is designed to enhance regional stability by 
maintaining an appropriate balance of power between Egypt and its principal former 
adversary Israel.139  In lieu of the Arab-Israeli wars since 1947 Washington has pursued 
policies that address an overall balance of power between Israel and its Arab neighbors.  
In lieu of Egypt’s status as the greatest Arab power, the Camp David Accord architects 
theorized that if Egypt could be transformed from an adversary of Israel to at least a 
tolerant neighbor, the other Arab states would be too weak to challenge Israel militarily—
thereby reducing the chance for attack by either side.  The appeal to balance of power 
directly addresses Egypt’s strategic culture, as President Mubarak has made clear: 
“history has taught us that the cause behind many wars is the weakness of one side.  This 
                                                 
137 Ben-David, op. cit. 
138 U.S. Department of State, Congressional…, op. cit., 483. 
139 The principal advantage to Israel granted by the Camp David accords was that formal peace with 
Egypt took the most powerful Arab military force out of Israel’s mix of adversaries. Some would argue that 
this fact allowed Israel to be excessively aggressive in the Levant. William B. Quandt, Peace Process, 
American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C., The Brookings 
Institution: 2005) 190. 
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prompts the second side to attack…Therefore, peace and stability must exist under the 
umbrella of a military force that protects and preserves them.”140 
Evidence that Egypt continues to view Israel as a threat to its national security 
was readily apparent when in 1996 Egypt conducted military exercises whereby Israel 
was portrayed as the adversary state; the exercise entailed an amphibious landing of 
mechanized infantry supported by the Egyptian naval and air forces: “the attack was 
supposed to be a response to an Israeli attack on the Egyptian front in which the Egyptian 
army first engages in a defensive battle and then switches to a counterattack, and finally 
takes over the whole of the Sinai including limited penetration over the international 
border.”141  Egypt’s persistent caution (if not overt mistrust) towards Israel leads the U.S. 
to mandate that every defense article sold to the state must be solely for defensive 
purposes; in practice they must also preserve a qualitative military advantage for Israel, 
guided by the concept that Israel faces a quantitative disadvantage with respect to its 
Arab neighbors’ collective military forces.   
This concept pertains to airpower capabilities in particular given its past 
significance in shaping regional military conflicts.  Egypt’s air-to-air weaponry is inferior 
to that which is possessed by Israel; however, the capabilities of Egypt’s air defense 
system acting in concert would make the cost of Israeli air attack excessively high.142  
Egypt’s airpower modernization efforts have built a force that is lesser than or equal to 
                                                 
140 Hillel Frisch, “Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army,” in Armed Forces in the Middle East; 
Politics and Strategy, edited by Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keany (Portland, OR, Frank Cass Publishers: 
2002) 96. 
141 Ibid., 96, 102.  
142 Egyptian Air Force F-16 weaponry includes beyond-visual range AIM-7 in addition to short range 
AIM-9 dogfight air-to-air missiles, which are quite capable but not as advanced as Israel’s air-to-air 
armament that includes the AIM-120 AMRAAM as well as the indigenously produced Python short range 
dogfight missiles (author’s opinion). Also, according to officials at the Secretary of the Air Force Office for 
International Affairs, concerns regarding Egypt’s communication security procedures are one factor that 
prevents the EAF from being eligible for the AIM-120 AMRAAM. James F. Mueller, Maj, USAF, Country 
Director, Mideast/ Africa Division, Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs Division. Interview by 
the author via e-mail, August 2, 2007. 
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Israeli capabilities but have succeeded in producing a viable deterrent to Israeli air attack.  
Thus far, the practice has been sufficient to preserve the peace between the two states.143 
The enduring inter-state peace facilitated by airpower balance has yet to bear fruit 
of comprehensive regional peace, as evidenced by ongoing conflicts between the Israelis 
and Palestinian factions within the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza as 
well as with external non-state actors in Lebanon.  Against the latter, Israel has 
intervened twice: in 1982 against the Palestinian Liberation Organization and again in 
2006 against Hizbollah.  During the most recent occasion Cairo’s view of the conflict 
paralleled that of Washington in that it initially assigned blame to Hizbollah’s militant 
activities (kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers) for inciting the Israeli military 
reprisal.  Mubarak’s assertion that Hizbollah’s regional influence is a “product of the 
malign influence of Iran and Syria in the region” is also shared by Washington.144  
It is important to note that prior to the peace between Israel and Egypt supported 
by U.S-Egyptian airpower security cooperation, it is unlikely that Egypt would have 
stood by while Israel invaded Lebanon without a serious consideration of military 
reprisal.145  The Mubarak regime’s position that Hizbollah represents more of a threat 
than Israel gives testimony to the extent of the alignment of the Egyptian and U.S. 
governments’ assessment of their regional interests.  While Israel’s conflicts within its 
borders and with actors in Lebanon represent persistent threats to regional stability, state-
                                                 
143 Provisions of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt reduced the opportunity for surprise 
attack by either side as they “led to a process of military cooperation to monitor implementation of the 
agreement” and “established the precedent of an asymmetrical balance of forces and territory in such as to 
address Israeli insecurities” and “reduced to a minimum the possibility of accidental clashes on land or sea 
or in the air.” Abdel Monem Said Aly, “The Middle East and The Persian Gulf: An Arab Perspective” in 
Cascade of Arms: Managing Conventional Weapons Proliferation, ed. Andrew J. Pierre (Washington, 
D.C., Brookings Institution Press: 1997) 272. 
144 Mubarak also feared that Hizbollah offered the Egyptian Brotherhood an example of how a 
popular Islamist group can build widespread popular base and challenge a regional power. Domestic 
support in Egypt for Hassan Nasrallah (Hizbollah’s leader) compelled Mubarak to moderate his anti-
Hizbollah rhetoric where upon he instead called for an immediate cease fire, respect Lebanese sovereignty, 
and restraint by both sides. In the conflict’s aftermath Egypt supported UNSC Resolution 1701 that called 
for the deployment of UNIFIL forces and Lebanese armed forces in the south. Cairo continues to urge the 
international community to consider Lebanon within broader context of Arab-Israeli issues. “External 
Affairs-Egypt,” article available at http://jmsa.com/JDIC/JMSA (accessed September 26, 2007). 
145 Some analysts suggest that poor economic conditions inside Egypt increased Mubarak’s 
dependency on U.S. assistance and therefore contributed to Egypt abstaining from countering Israel. 
Cleveland, op cit. 
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on-state conflict in the region would arguably be more disruptive to regional peace than 
the current more limited conflicts between Israel and these non-state actors.146  
Fortunately, inter-state conflict has thus far been obviated by U.S. security cooperation 
efforts.  
Further, Egypt has been a reliable broker for attempts at resolving what many 
perceive to be the root cause for instability in the Levant, the enduring Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts that have persisted since the foundation of the Israeli state.  Mubarak endorsed 
the Declaration of Principals signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993 
and more recently hosted talks between the Israelis and Palestinians in 1999, 2000, and 
2005.147  While current events testify to the ineffectiveness of attempts to achieve a 
lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace, the lack of results thus far do not undermine the 
importance of Egypt’s role in negotiations toward that objective.   
Egypt’s cooperation on security matters has not been confined to the immediate 
region, but extends to the broader Middle East and beyond.  The most obvious 
manifestation came in 1991 when the Egyptian armed forces participated in the allied 
coalition during Operation Desert Storm that succeeded in expelling Iraq from Kuwait in 
1991.148  U.S. and Egyptian officers attributed the combined training afforded by the 
Bright Star military exercises as being instrumental to facilitating U.S.-Egyptian 
cooperation and military compatibility during Desert Storm.149   More importantly, as 
Egypt represents the most populous Arab state, one cannot underestimate the contribution 
that Egypt’s participation gave to the legitimacy of the coalition (especially when 
compared to Washington’s subsequent endeavors in Iraq that enjoyed no such Arab 
                                                 
146 In the past, inter-state conflict in the region has threatened broader conflict. During the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War the Cold War superpowers were almost drawn into direct confrontation to the point that the 
Nixon administration put U.S. nuclear forces on alert for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Yergin, op. cit., 604-605. Also Cleveland, op. cit., 375. 
147 Sharp, op. cit., 13. 
148 Egyptian forces suffered nine killed and 74 wounded in the fighting. Sharp, op. cit., 5, 25.  
149 Bright Star exercises in 1999 included 66,000 personnel from 11 states, including Egypt, the U.S., 
France, the UK, Italy, Greece, and Kuwait. Frisch, op. cit., 101. Also Sharp, op. cit., 25. 
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participation).150  Egypt has also contributed to international military cooperative efforts 
by participating in peace-keeping efforts in Somalia and Yugoslavia, Sudan, Liberia, East 
Timor, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, all which are efforts facilitated by aid granted under 
U.S. security cooperation.151  Finally, with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, the U.S. 
relies on Egypt’s status as an ardent non-proliferator to promote stability in the region 
and beyond.   
F. ASSESSING INFLUENCE—NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 
Egypt’s choice to forego nuclear weapons results from an evolution of policy 
decisions since the time of Nasser.  Initially Egypt’s nuclear development was limited to 
peaceful energy production, but the revelation of an Israeli nuclear reactor in 1960 
compelled Nasser to assert that any acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel would drive 
Egypt to “acquire them at any price.”152  During the 1960s state efforts to both 
indigenously produce nuclear weapons as well as acquire foreign-manufactured nuclear 
weapons were overcome by various endogenous and exogenous obstacles.  Ultimately, 
the 1967 defeat at the hand of the Israelis devastated the Egyptian economy and led to the 
elimination of funding for nuclear programs, where after Nasser instead focused what 
resources were available on bolstering Egypt’s conventional forces.153 
Like his predecessor, Anwar Sadat initially claimed that Egypt would do whatever 
it took to acquire nuclear weapons if Israel pursued its own capability.  However, the 
outcome of the Camp David Accords mitigated to a great extent Egypt’s previous 
                                                 
150 As a reward for Egypt’s participation, the U.S. subsequently cancelled $7 billion of Egypt’s 
military debts. Cleveland, op. cit., 481. 
151 Sharp, op. cit., 26. Also U.S. Department of State, Congressional…, op. cit., 484. 
152 Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser Egypt established the Egyptian Atomic Energy Agency 
(AEA) in 1955 for peaceful purposes, and with help from the Soviet Union completed construction of its 
first nuclear reactor in 1961, which was too small to present a proliferation risk. Rober J. Einhorn, “Egypt: 
Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course,” in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their 
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economic constraints as well as multiple delays in closing deals on reactor construction, bureaucratic 
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rationale for its desire to possess nuclear weapons—the ever-present prospect of war with 
Israel.  The agreement’s underlying provision of massive security assistance to Egypt by 
the United States was sufficient to persuade Sadat to accept the bilateral peace without 
having reached a non-nuclear deal with Israel, much to the chagrin of many in the 
Egyptian defense establishment.  Sadat instead renounced nuclear weapons as one of the 
facets of Egyptian security strategy along with continued peace with Israel, a pursuit of 
regional stability, economic growth, and a close security relationship with the United 
States.154  Despite frustrations toward Israel’s nuclear policy of “ambiguity,” Egypt 
became an official member of the NPT in February 1981 and has been a stalwart 
promoter of nonproliferation ever since.155   
Under Mubarak Egypt continues to view the alleged nuclear imbalance with 
frustration and as a result has attempted to use mechanisms of the NPT, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and the promotion of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle 
East as a means to coerce Israel to alter its nuclear policy toward one of 
“denuclearization”…so far to no effect.  Accordingly, Egypt has abstained from any 
additional nuclear agreements since signing the NPT and has refused to sign bans on 
chemical weapons as long as Israel allegedly maintains a nuclear weapons capability.156 
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155 Egypt signed the NPT in 1968 but did not initially ratify the treaty because of concerns over 
Israel’s alleged nuclear weapons capability. Egypt’s decision to ratify the Non-Proliferation-Treaty amid 
Israeli intransigence towards the NPT and its stated nuclear policy of “ambiguity” was in part due to its 
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156 Hillel Frisch, “Guns and Butter in the Egyptian Army” in Armed Forces in the Middle East; 
Politics and Strategy, edited by Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keany (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers: 
2002) 103. Also, some analysts might argue that nuclear proliferation to U.S. allies in the region would be 
warranted as a response to an Iranian nuclear capability. This paper will not seek to refute this argument; 
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On the surface, U.S. security cooperation has been instrumental in affecting 
Egypt’s non-nuclear stance; the question is: to what extent…and will this policy 
instrument continue to be effective amid nuclear proliferation in the Middle East?  In his 
efforts to explain state nuclear choices, Scott Sagan’s “security model” offers simply that 
“states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, 
especially nuclear threats,” and as a corollary—states forego proliferation in “the absence 
of the fundamental military threats.”157  This model of analysis suggests that Egypt’s 
security confidence is sufficiently bolstered by U.S. security cooperation such that it 
obviates the necessity for an indigenous nuclear deterrent—even amid a presumed Israeli 
nuclear weapons capability.  
Of course, the possibility of regional proliferation pressures Egypt’s non-nuclear 
strategic culture; nonetheless, the entrenchment of U.S. security cooperation into Egypt’s 
strategic culture mandates that any future desires to alter its nuclear course include an 
assessment of the costs, which for Egypt amount to it potentially losing $2 billion of 
security assistance per year.  For now, Egypt’s dependency on the provision of U.S. 
security assistance gives the United States a tangible measure of influence over its 
proliferation decisions.  While one cannot guarantee that current levels of security 
cooperation will continue to satisfy Egypt’s strategic culture, one can safely assume that 
any degradation or material reduction in the relationship would require Egypt’s policy-
makers to reconsider its nuclear stance.  For this reason, Egypt’s contentment regarding 
its portion of the regional airpower balance remains critical. 
As Cairo desires to maintain a prominent role in regional and international affairs, 
Egypt’s nuclear stance is also affected by its ability to garner prestige through it.  The 
current regime has used Egypt’s status as a stalwart non-proliferator as a platform from 
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Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vo. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-1997).  
 59
which to lead other states—for example, by calling for the creation of a nuclear-weapons-
free-zone in the Middle East.  Once more, regional proliferation threatens to undermine 
the non-proliferation regime upon which Egypt invests its status.  As Arab League 
Secretary General Amre Moussa stated, “Egypt will never accept playing second fiddle.  
It will do whatever it takes to maintain its position in the Middle East and in the Arab 
World.”158  Thus far, the leverage afforded to Egypt via its security relationship with the 
United States has mitigated desires to gain leverage in the international system through 
its own nuclear weapons capability.  Airpower modernization efforts and other 
components of airpower cooperation represent an instrument through which Washington 
may continue to bolster Egyptian prestige amid an environment of proliferation 
speculation.   
To a minor extent, airpower security cooperation can also impact domestic factors 
affecting Egypt’s nuclear decisions.  A state’s nuclear choices are made by groups of 
domestic actors inside which there often exists a pro-nuclear contingent that consists of 
high-ranking military officers (in addition to scientists and those with nuclear business 
interests).159  In Egypt, despite Mubarak’s dictate regarding Egypt’s non-nuclear posture, 
there has been some evidence of dissatisfaction among the Egyptian military elite 
regarding the “lack of balance” vis-à-vis Israel (in an apparent reference to the Israeli 
qualitative conventional advantage and alleged nuclear capability).160  Currently, there is 
not evidence of any pro-proliferation actors having the capacity to challenge Mubarak, 
although at least one general has tried to do so regarding his discontent with Egypt’s non-
nuclear stance.161  However, the impending transition in power over the next decade to  
 
 
                                                 
158 Einhorn, op. cit., 65. 
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160 Einhorn, op. cit., 58. Also see “Egypt’s nuclear dilemma,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest (October 13, 
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161 The Minister of Defense during the 1980s, General Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, “sought Mubarak’s 
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another executive actor represents a chance for Egypt to alter its nuclear position.162  
While airpower security cooperation cannot directly affect this dynamic, it allows for 
Washington to remain engaged with the institution close to power—the military.  Further, 
as long as airpower security cooperation persists, the inheritor of executive power must 
contend with its value when assessing the cost-benefit analysis of Egypt’s nuclear 
decisions.  
Unfortunately, there are elements within Egyptian society pressuring Egypt’s non-
nuclear stance that for the most part are beyond the reach of influence of security 
cooperation.  The Peoples’ Assembly speaker has issued warning that “street pressures” 
fomented by the rhetoric of Egypt’s religious elite could make the current course of 
nonproliferation difficult to maintain.  Islamic leaders in Egypt have portrayed the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons as a religious duty, as stated in a fatwa issued by al-
Azhar’s Religious Ruling Committee in 2002.163  According to the head of the Religious 
Ruling Committee, Sheikh Ali Abu al-Hassan, “what is happening to the Muslims in all 
countries of the world is the result of weakness; and if the Muslims obtain this [nuclear] 
weapon, no one will conspire against them.”164   
This domestic dynamic alludes to a potential limitation of airpower security 
cooperation—the ability to impact political trends in the societies of partnering states.  
Overall however these opinions have not found influence among those with decision-
making power.  Rather, to date the robust and enduring nature of U.S. airpower security 
cooperation with Egypt has been a decision-shaping instrument that has encouraged 
Cairo to adopt nonproliferation as a component of its strategic culture.  While future 
proliferation in the region will give cause for Cairo to reconsider its nuclear stance, its 
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policy decisions must account for the value of U.S. airpower security cooperation and its 
contribution to Egypt’s national security.  The next section reveals investment returns 
from U.S. airpower security cooperation in the form of Egypt’s impact on the conflict of 
our times, the Global War on Terror. 
G. ASSESSING INFLUENCE—GWOT   
Egypt and the U.S. have a marriage of interests in thwarting terrorism as Islamic 
radical offshoot groups of the Muslim Brotherhood have both threatened to overthrow the 
Mubarak regime as well as attack the United States—”the far enemy.”165  Two such 
groups are the Jamaah Islamiya (Islamic Group) and Al Jihad, the latter of which focused 
on targeted assassinations of government officials including the 1981 assassination of 
Anwar Sadat.166  Al Jihad has produced some notable figures in international terrorism, 
such as its former leader, Ayman Al-Zawarhiri, who is now widely infamous as the chief 
spokesperson for Al-Qaeda and second-in-command to Osama bin Laden.  Jamaah 
Islamiya’s contributions to terrorism in Egypt came in the form of a campaign from 
1992-1997 that resulted in 1300 deaths, including ninety foreign tourists.  The last two 
years in particular have seen an upsurge in terrorist activity.167 
While the Mubarak administration’s methods in combating these groups have 
been criticized as amounting to overt dictatorial oppression, the U.S. security apparatus 
pragmatically views the regime’s efforts as having successfully thwarted terrorism within 
its society.  The current administration particularly values Cairo’s capacity to provide 
                                                 
165 Fundamentalist founders such as Sayyid Qutb promoted takfeeri ideology, which deemed the post-
colonial military regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak as essentially non-Muslim, impious apostates 
unworthy to rule the ummah. One such extremist, Ayman al-Zawahiri was imprisoned along with others 
following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. It was upon his release that he emigrated to Afghanistan where 
he participated in the jihad against the Soviet invasion and established contacts with other like-minded 
Sunni fundamentalists, including Osama bin Ladin. Zawahiri’s transition from his long held belief that 
Islamic fundamentalists should prioritize the overthrow of regional apostate regimes to the more 
transnational priority against the United States (the proverbial “far enemy”) was partly due to the lack of 
success in bringing down regimes like Mubarak’s. For more information see Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far 
Enemy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
166 Sharp, op. cit., 16. 
167 On April 26, 2006, Egyptian terrorists attacked a resort in Dahab on the Sinai Peninsula killing 21 
people. Two days later suicide bombers attacked a police station in northern Sinai and a base camp of 
multinational observers that were part of the peacekeeping mission that has been in place since the bilateral 
peace treaty of 1979. Ibid., 1, 16-17. 
 62
valuable intelligence regarding terrorist groups that some critics suggest is derived via 
looser interrogation methods that they allege amount to torture.168  Nonetheless, from 
what open sources can gather, the U.S. appears to have benefited from intelligence 
sharing with Egypt.  Egypt also supports the GWOT via its geographic position as the 
gateway to the CENTCOM area of responsibility which includes Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Egypt’s provision of over-flight rights and access to the Suez Canal by U.S. warships 
represents a critical measure of cooperation without which logistical support of U.S. 
forces in CENTCOM would be severely degraded.169  Also, while domestic opinion 
forbade Egyptian participation in the coalition that participated in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Egypt has supported U.S. efforts in Iraq indirectly by training Iraqi Security 
Forces and by conducting training exercises with the nascent Iraqi army.170  Egypt was 
also one of the first countries to send an ambassador to Iraq in 2005.171  Also in 
Afghanistan, Egypt maintains a field hospital at Bagram Air Base as part of the ongoing 
efforts to establish security there.  Finally, Egyptian soldiers have deployed to the Sudan 
for peacekeeping operations.   
In short, Egypt’s cooperation in the GWOT has produced measurable, 
quantifiable results—representing a contemporary manifestation of return for 
Washington’s heavy investment in Egyptian security.  However, U.S. policy also calls for 
security cooperation to facilitate the advance of democracy; given criticism that asserts 
the Mubarak administration’s counter-terrorism methods amount to dictatorial 
                                                 
168 Dana Priest and Dan Eggen, “Terror Suspect Alleges Torture: Detainee Says U.S. Sent Him to 
Egypt Before Guantanamo,” The Washington Post, Thursday, January 6, 2005; A01. Available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A51726-2005Jan5?language=printer (accessed November 2, 
2007). 
169 Egypt waived the 30-day prior notification requirement to pass nuclear armed U.S. warships 
through the Suez Canal. Sharp, op. cit., 15. 
170 “In late 2004 an Iraqi infantry company was invited to Egypt to participate in a joint training 
program with the Egyptian Army. According to the Egyptian government, 134 soldiers from Iraq’s 5th 
Infantry Division trained alongside Egypt’s 3rd Infantry Division at the Mubarak Military City in northern 
Egypt.” Christopher M. Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol Migdalovitz, Alfred Prados, Jeremy Sharp, 
Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, CRS Report to Congress, Order Code RL33793; updated 
September 12, 2007, 6. 
171 The Egyptian ambassador was later abducted and murdered by insurgents in Iraq. Sharp, op. cit., 
15. 
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oppression, simultaneous calls for greater democratization and for continued combating 
of terrorist organizations inside Egypt hints at a tension in U.S. policy. 
H. ASSESSING POLICY OUTCOMES—DEMOCRACY ADVANCEMENT 
U.S. policy towards Egypt emphasizes need for political reforms to create a “more 
transparent and democratic government while also acknowledging the important role 
Egypt plays in the GWOT”. 172  Security cooperation with Egypt is intended to facilitate 
democratization by “bolster[ing] local capabilities to contain conflict, protect national 
territory, and pre-empt the establishment of safe havens for terrorists, while enhancing 
civilian oversight of the military.”173  Political observers are quick to note, however, that 
true “civilian oversight” of the military is an ideal challenged by the presence of an 
enduring military autocracy and a parliament that is securely under the control of the 
executive.  The regime is routinely criticized by journalists, scholars, human rights 
organizations, as well as some U.S. Congressmen who are quick to note the Mubarak 
regime’s non-democratic characteristics that include the squashing of political dissent and 
the conduct of widespread arrests and detainments without due process.174  Yet U.S. 
desires for the regime to crack down on “extremists” in the name of the GWOT amid 
simultaneous calls for greater political liberalization reveals an inherent tension in U.S. 
policy toward Egypt.175   
                                                 
172 U.S. Department of State, Congressional…, op. cit., 483. Also: The National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism (September 2006) promotes the establishment of “effective democracies” that 
preserve freedom and dignity for individuals in those societies who might otherwise be vulnerable to the 
terrorists’ agenda. To be deemed “effective,” the strategy states that a democracy must not merely provide 
for free and fair elections, but must also uphold “basic human rights, including freedom of religion, 
conscience, speech, assembly, and press,” 9. 
173 U.S. Department of State, Congressional…, op. cit., 476. 
174 “After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the ensuing U.S. focus on promoting 
democracy in the Middle East, the Mubarak regime has come under increasing U.S. pressure to accelerate 
political reforms and make Egypt more democratic. In and effort to control the reform agenda without 
relinquishing their grip on power, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) have instituted 
some political reforms, while emphasizing the need for economic growth as a precondition for democratic 
change,” Sharp, op. cit., 6. 
175 From 1992-1997, Jamaah Islamiya implemented a terror campaign that resulted in 1300 deaths 
which included ninety foreign tourists. In response, the Mubarak regime confronted the group with “non-
democratic measures” which purportedly included seizure without warrant, detention without trial, 
conviction without appeal, and what some would suggest are interrogation techniques that amount to 
physical torture, Sharp, op. cit., 16. 
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One may view U.S. security assistance dollars as a military-enabler in Egypt; 
therefore when assessing the impact of U.S. security cooperation on democratization 
efforts it is prudent to examine the role that the military plays in Egyptian society and 
governance.  Scholars describe the military as being the “preeminent institution in 
Egyptian society” that has been used by the regime to maintain internal security and its 
hold on political power.176  The army is the most politically influential component due to 
its size and impact on the economy, while the Egyptian Air Force is typically viewed as 
being the most professional, educated and western-oriented service and is considered to 
be more efficient and less bureaucratically burdened.  The air force also enjoys close ties 
to the ruling regime due to the fact that President Mubarak was the former top air force 
commander.177   
The economic and social impact of the military stems from the number of jobs it 
provides to the male population.  The army employs hundreds of thousands of young 
people in the midst of an economy that suffers from fifteen to twenty percent 
unemployment rates.178  The military also has its own companies that produce 
pharmaceuticals, consumer products, and manufactured goods and have expanded into 
areas such as water management and the production of electricity, prompting Egyptian 
newspapers to laud the military’s contribution to developing services that benefit 
Egyptian society.179  The officer corps enjoys a higher standard of living and better 
healthcare, which encourages loyalty to the government.180  Political opposition to the 
ruling regime criticizes both this higher standard of living as well as the military’s fiscal 
                                                 
176 Sharp, op. cit., 7; also, Frisch states that in contrast to other Arab states, “the values held by the 
armed forces are assumed to be the values still cherished by Egyptian society. Frisch, op. cit., 94. 
177 Sharp, op. cit., 5. 
178 Some estimates claim that the military employs up to twelve percent of Egyptian males and 
Egypt’s defense industries employ an additional 100,000. Sharp, op. cit., 7; also, the conscripts number 
approximately 80,000 per year. Frisch, op. cit., 101.  
179 Frisch, 94, 106. 
180 “The metamorphosis of the military into producer as well as employer is now an important chunk 
of the economy, and helps to assure the loyalties of the military to the government and the dominant party, 
the NDP.” Sherifa Zuhur, “Egypt: Security, Political, And Islamist Challenges,” September 2007. Strategic 
Studies Institute (SSI) publications. Available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB787.pdf (accessed October 5, 2007). 
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autonomy, asserting that “there is little civilian control over the military’s budget.”181  
This last point alludes to an important dynamic in Egyptian politics: the discord between 
the ruling military autocracy and Islamist opposition—and begs the question as to what 
role the military plays in this dynamic.   
Anwar Sadat’s assassination at the hands of Islamist-leaning members of the 
military engendered a persistent fear of Islamist influence in the military, a concern that 
so far has precluded the military being used against Islamist opposition groups or to 
counter terrorism inside Egypt.182  Rather, the military leadership has separated itself 
from the repressive policies of the Interior Ministry and has “mainly concentrated on 
providing a decisive deterrent force positioned in the background” against terrorism, a 
distinction that has protected to some extent the favorable opinion of the military by the 
general population.183  The government has attempted to shield military personnel form 
the reach of Islamists by going through “great pains” to establish military cities isolated 
from civilian society.184  Military journals also routinely attempt to de-legitimize 
fundamentalist ideologies and the groups that promote them.185 
Unfortunately, for the United States and the Mubarak regime, grievances 
regarding the regime and anti-Americanism espoused by Islamist political groups 
permeate throughout Egyptian society.  The reality is that since the U.S. bombing of 
Afghanistan in response to 9/11 popular consensus has viewed the U.S.-led GWOT as a 
war against Muslims despite Washington’s repeated claims to the contrary.186  According 
to a recent public opinion survey, the vast majority (over two-thirds) of those surveyed 
believe that U.S. desires to control oil and dominate the region supersede intentions of 
                                                 
181 There is no legislative oversight of the military budget and “emergency legislation” in Egypt 
prevents oversight of the arms industry from the legislature and the press. Frisch, op. cit., 106; also Sharp, 
op. cit., 7. 
182 One of Sadat’s assassins included a colonel on active duty and a lieutenant colonel reservist. 
Frisch, op. cit., 104-105. 
183 Zuhur, op. cit., 17; Quote is taken from Frisch, op. cit., 104. 
184 Frisch, op. cit., 105. 
185 One such article was titled “The Extremists Commit Major Sins in Order to Avoid Small Ones” by 
Ben Muhammad Shabal. Ibid. 
186 Zuhur, op. cit., 9. 
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spreading democracy, human rights, and regional stability.  Over three-quarters of those 
polled stated that the United States and Israel represented the two countries who posed 
the greatest threat to Egypt.  Also, since the Israeli war with Hizbollah in 2006 “being 
Muslim” has supplanted “being Egyptian” and “being Arab” as the principal measure of 
individual identity, a trend that portends greater influence by Islamist opposition forces.  
Yet, those surveyed also stated that when making policy decisions the government should 
prioritize what is best for Egypt over what is best for Muslims, Arabs, or the world—
indicating a preference for pragmatism over ideology.187 
These attitudes challenge the U.S. to market its ideology for greater 
democratization in the region, a policy that is largely viewed as either arrogant or wholly 
insincere.  The impact of the perception of unfairness regarding U.S policy towards the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue and the perception that the GWOT is a moniker for U.S. war 
against Muslims plays into Islamist rhetoric that the U.S.-Egyptian security relationship 
represents an instrument of U.S. control exacted onto a puppet Mubarak regime.  
Arguably, there is little that security cooperation instruments can do to facilitate a change 
in public attitudes.   
Airpower security cooperation policies’ effects on democratization are either 
minimal or undetermined, but it is realistic to presume that they facilitate the regime’s 
stronghold on political power.  One may safely predict, however, that even with the rise 
in influence of Islamist political organizations and impending transfer of power within 
the next ten years, the military is likely to maintain considerable influence on Egyptian 
politics.188  This presumption of military influence supports the importance of 
                                                 
187 Other polling data includes the following: 69 percent believed that spreading democracy was a 
false U.S. objective; 69 percent surveyed had an unfavorable opinion of the United States; 79 percent had 
“no confidence in the U.S.;” 72 percent stated that U.S. policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict were “very 
important” determinant in their attitude towards the U.S.; 90 percent thought the war in Iraq resulted in less 
democracy in the Middle East; 79 percent had a more favorable view of Hezbollah after the 2006 war; as a 
matter of personal identity, fifty percent now prioritize being a Muslim over an Egyptian citizen or Arab 
(opposite trend from the past). All surveys are based on urban samples. Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and 
Development University of Maryland/Zogby International “2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey: A 
Six Country Study: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and UAE;” Professor Shibley 
Telhami, Principal Investigator (survey came in the form of a PowerPoint Presentation obtained from 
James Russell, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School). 
188 Mubarak is 79 years old. Zuhur states that the U.S. should be prepared for transition of government 
to a successor by 2011, op. cit.  
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maintaining the security relationship with Egypt that at least grants the U.S. access to 
those who have influence in developing Egyptian policies.  The ability of security 
cooperation programs (particularly IMET) to translate the importance of civilian rule of 
the military has not produced any direct results in Egypt, nor is it likely to of its own 
accord.  The goal towards greater democratization is better left to other policy 
instruments such as the Middle East Partner Initiative, but these policies are also 
burdened by widespread suspicion about what Egyptians believe to be true U.S. 
intentions in the region.    
I. CONCLUSION 
For the most part Egypt represents a positive example of what Washington can 
achieve through a robust and enduring (albeit expensive) security relationship.  Airpower 
security cooperation in particular has contributed to Egypt’s perception of its own 
security and has afforded it a measure of prestige—the outcomes of which are now 
regional inter-state stability, Egypt’s active promotion of nuclear non-proliferation, and 
its cooperation in a multitude of regional issues including the Global War on Terror.  
More specifically the Egyptian case suggests that sufficiently managing a state’s 
airpower balance with respect to its principal rivalry can foment inter-state regional 
peace.  It is important to note however that Egypt’s nuclear choices have contrasted 
sharply with those made by Pakistan; it is therefore prudent to analyze this disparity 
further with regard to how U.S. airpower security cooperation with Iraq can shape that 
state’s future nuclear choices.  Finally, the one notable exception where the policy 
instrument has thus far fallen short of objectives is with respect to democracy 
advancement.  In a state ruled by an autocratic regime—one in which the military 
maintains dominant influence—security cooperation has displayed a limited to 
nonexistent capacity to promote democratic reforms, especially when U.S. 
simultaneously calls for the recipient regime to combat terrorist organizations within the 
society it governs.  This last observation portends similar challenges for security 
cooperation objectives in Iraq.  
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IV. FUTURE AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION WITH 
IRAQ—PREDICTING INFLUENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The current security and political instabilities in Iraq in addition to domestic 
political discontent in the U.S. might seem to render moot any discussions regarding 
long-term security commitments between Washington and Baghdad.  However, it is 
probable that even after a large scale withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Iraq, 
Washington will seek to maintain a long term presence in Iraq via its already established 
airbase posture in the country.189  The fact is that the USAF cannot precipitously 
withdraw without creating an airpower vacuum over Mesopotamia; in the midst of 
political and sectarian instability inside Iraq, such open undefended airspace might invite 
Iraq’s regional neighbors to intervene in support of their perceived interests.190  Potential 
conflicts include Turkish power projection against Kurdish factions in northern Iraq or 
perhaps intervention by Saudi Arabia and Iran into a widened Sunni-Shia conflict inside 
Iraq.  Also, because Iraqi airspace currently serves as a buffer between Israel and Iran, the 
removal of USAF air defenses would permit either party to attack the other.   Quite 
simply, maintaining air sovereignty in Iraq is a requisite to preventing further regional 
instability that could lead to a broader war.   
This chapter applies lessons from U.S airpower security cooperation with Egypt 
and Pakistan toward future cooperation with Iraq using the following assumptions:   
 
                                                 
189 Steve Holland, “Bush envisions U.S. presence in Iraq like S. Korea,” Reuters, Wednesday, May 
30, 2007. Available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN3041621320070530?pageNumber=1 (accessed 
November 2, 2007). Also, comments made by the Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynn to an audience 
at the Naval Postgraduate School indicate there are preliminary plans for a long term USAF presence in 
Iraq. Michael Wynn, Secretary of the United States Air Force. Questioned posed by the author at a USAF 
officers’ call, Naval Postgraduate School, September 22, 2006. 
190 Without a U.S. presence in Iraq, Turkey would no longer have a compelling reason to exercise 
restraint against Kurdish militants. U.S. and Turkish alliance via their NATO membership makes the 
current prospect of Turkish airpower projection against Kurdish militants unlikely. 
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• Iraq will be a unitary state with which the United States will be interested 
in maintaining a long-term alliance;  
• Ensuring the sovereignty of Iraqi airspace is essential to regional stability 
and is in the interest of the United States and Iraq;  
• The United States is likely to continue past diplomatic patterns by 
engaging in airpower security cooperation with the Iraqi government.   
The previous chapters’ analysis of airpower security cooperation with Pakistan 
and Egypt suggest the following factors are key variables that shape outcomes of security 
cooperation policies: understanding the recipient state’s strategic culture and addressing 
its principal security needs, using airpower security assistance to maintain an appropriate 
regional balance of power, and inculcating an enduring sense of U.S. commitment to the 
relationship.  This chapter draws on these lessons to predict Washington’s capacity to 
influence Iraq regarding regional stability, nuclear proliferation, military cooperation 
including the GWOT, and democratization efforts.  First, however, the next section offers 
an overview of U.S. and Iraqi interests in the region and the manner in which airpower 
impacts the regional strategic calculus.   
B. U.S. AND IRAQI REGIONAL INTERESTS 
The unfortunate reality facing both the current and next U.S. presidential 
administrations is that Iraq’s domestic insecurity threatens to destabilize the region.  U.S. 
prestige in the international system is at stake—and over time will be affected by what 
type of state Iraq becomes: an Iraq that can “govern itself, sustain itself, and defend 
itself” or one whose internal instabilities and sectarian conflicts foment anxiety onto 
Iraq’s neighbors, increasing the possibility for their military intervention.191  The Iraqi 
Study Group stated that to achieve the Washington’s desired end-state in Iraq, it must 
build Baghdad’s capacity to maintain its territorial integrity, pursue peace with its  
 
                                                 
191 Comments by President George Bush regarding goals in Iraq, as published in the Iraqi Study 
Group Report. James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs; other members include Lawrence S. 
Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. 
Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson. (New York: Vintage Books, 2006) 40. 
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neighbors, and deny sanctuary to terrorist organizations.192  Airpower security 
cooperation is an instrument that can help to achieve these three objectives over the long 
haul. 
The U.S. will expect to derive certain benefits from its security relationship with 
Iraq regarding regional diplomatic cooperation, access to oil, and basing rights.  In 
particular, Washington will likely expect Iraq to present a moderate and non-aggressive 
stance towards Israel and will encourage Baghdad to formerly recognize the Israeli state. 
Washington will also desire that its security relationship with Iraq actively contain 
Iranian regional influence, something that is of particular importance to the region’s 
Sunni states (especially Saudi Arabia).193  In lieu of Iraq’s immense oil reserves the U.S. 
will expect the Iraqi government to be a responsible member of OPEC that promotes 
policies that ensure the continuous and uninterrupted flow of oil to the world economy.  
Washington is likely to lobby for preferred access by U.S. oil companies in developing 
Iraq’s oil industries over foreign competitors from states such as Russia and China.194  
Finally, U.S. policy precedence in the region suggests that Washington will expect the 
Iraqi state to allow military access (basing rights) in return for security assistance 
dollars.195 
For its part, the future unitary Iraqi government will have its own expectations 
regarding security cooperation with the United States.  First, Iraq will desire adequate 
strength that gives it the capacity to not only resist meddling in its internal affairs by 
regional neighbors but also the capacity to influence regional matters.  With respect to 
                                                 
192 Iraqi Study Group Report, op. cit. 
193 “During a well publicized speech in New York in September 2005, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince 
Saud al Faisal commented that “we are handing the whole country [Iraq] over to Iran without reason,” and 
warned of increased Sunni-Shiite violence.” Christopher M. Blanchard, Kenneth Katzman, Carol 
Migdalovitz, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy Sharp, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, CRS Report 
to Congress, September 12, 2007, 18. Reference given is Reuters, “Saudi Says U.S. Policy Handing Iraq 
over to Iran,” September 20, 2005.  
194 “The United States imports about 660,000 barrels per day of crude oil from Iraq,” Kenneth 
Katzman, Iraq: Post Saddam Governance and Security, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31339, 
December 6, 2006, 24-25. 
195 For more on extensive U.S. basing presence in the region see Kenneth Katzman, The Persian 
Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003. CRS Report for Congress, Order Code 31533. December 19, 2002, 19-
22. 
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Iran, while Baghdad will resist Tehran’s influence in domestic affairs, it will not 
welcome serving as a U.S. staging area for any conflict with Iran.  With respect to the 
region, Iraq will desire its security and economic strength to give it a capacity to 
influence the decisions of bodies such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, 
and OPEC.196  Also, Baghdad will expect its relationship with Washington to afford it 
leverage on the international stage via its political and economic influence in 
organizations such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, the World 
Trade Organization, and the G8.  Finally, because public perception of Iraq’s diplomatic 
sovereignty is critical to regime legitimacy, the Iraqi government is likely to press for a 
minimal U.S. footprint, as both the cases of Egypt and Pakistan show the degree to which 
widespread anti-U.S. sentiment can adversely affect public opinions of regimes that 
maintain a security relationship with the U.S.  Accordingly, Baghdad will seek to 
maintain an image of autonomy from Washington and will likely resist any heavy-handed 
attempts to use security assistance as an instrument of coercion, especially with respect to 
the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the development of its oil industry.197   
Airpower security cooperation policies will have to account for these interests that 
will influence Iraq’s strategic culture if they are to be successful.  Fortunately, for the 
U.S., airpower’s role in shaping the region’s geopolitical terrain gives it added 
significance and makes it a viable tool through which to invest in U.S. and Iraqi interests. 
C. ROLE OF REGIONAL AIRPOWER  
Airpower has played a prominent role in shaping the outcome of regional military 
conflicts since 1967 when Israel showed how effective use of airpower could facilitate 
the defeat of a numerically superior force.  Iraq too learned a hard lesson at the behest of 
                                                 
196 Iraq is not a member of the GCC, but is certainly affecedt by, and would like to have the capacity 
to affect, its decisions.  
197 These two issues are widely believed to be central to U.S. designs in the region: to preserve Israeli 
hegemony over Arabs and to control the oil; hence, the government in Baghdad will be particularly 
sensitive to how its policies are perceived by the public to be representative of Iraqi, and not American 
interests. See: “2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey: A Six Country Study: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and UAE;” Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development University of 
Maryland/Zogby International; Professor Shibley Telhami, Principal Investigator (survey came in the form 
of a PowerPoint Presentation obtained from James Russell, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School). 
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Israeli airpower in 1981 when the IAF destroyed its Osriaq nuclear facility.198  Mindful 
of airpower’s importance in modern warfare, Saddam built up the IqAF to considerable 
strength using mostly Russian and French hardware as part of his quest to make Iraq into 
a first-rate military power.  Saddam used the IqAF extensively during the Iran-Iraq war in 
support of ground forces and eventually used it to employ chemical weapons against 
Iranian troops.199  The effectiveness of Iraqi airpower in the conflict has been debated, 
but among the Iraqi populous the performance of the IqAF imbued a significant measure 
of pride.200   
Domestically, Saddam used his airpower assets to quell internal rebellions, acts 
for which he garnered international infamy by employing chemicals against Kurdish 
civilians in Northern Iraq in 1988.  Later following the war with the U.S. led coalition in 
1991, Saddam once again used airpower to crush internal uprisings of the Kurds as well 
as Shia rebels in southern Iraq; both events compelled the U.N. to establish and enforce 
“no-fly-zones” in northern and southern Iraq over the following decade.  After a decade 
of these operations (OSW and ONW), coalition airpower systematically dismantled Iraqi 
air defenses such that at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom the coalition enjoyed “air 
dominance,” a condition under which coalition air assets operated in the skies of Iraq 
with near impunity. 
One of the outcomes of Operation Desert Storm was that it had a profound effect 
on airpower’s status as a national instrument of power.  The display of U.S. airpower 
induced regional regimes to seek like capabilities; the trend over the ensuing decade was 
that air forces became a mechanism through which regimes chose to bolster their status 
among their neighbors.  As a result, the United States defense industry benefited from 
                                                 
198 Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq-Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
(Autumn 1982), 114-142. 
199 Andrew Rathmell, “Middle East, Chemical Weapons In The Middle East - Lessons From Iraq,” 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, (Vol. 7, Issue 12), 1 December 1995.  
200 Abbas Kadhim, Professor of Middle East Studies, Naval Post Graduate School. Interview by the 
author. December 4, 2006. 
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robust foreign military sales of fighter aircraft to the region, a process through which 
Washington garnered basing rights in purchasing states’ territories.201   
Largely as a result of U.S. FMS, the contemporary environment finds Iraq’s 
neighbors all possessing measurable airpower capacity, but those with the greatest 
capability to project power onto other states are Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia because 
of their modern weapon systems and indigenous air refueling capabilities.  Other Gulf 
States have acquired highly modern airpower assets, but without air refueling their power 
projection is limited by the combat radius of their fighter aircraft.  Iran has a less capable 
air force but should not be discounted as it is continuing to modernize.202  The result is 
that in the current strategic context Iraq sits among states that have bolstered their 
airpower capabilities significantly since 1991 while its air force has been wholly 
dismantled.  In order for Iraq to regain regional prestige, its future airpower capacity must 
be quantitatively and qualitatively matched to that of its neighbors.  Accordingly, U.S. 
policy makers need to carefully design and implement security cooperation instruments 
such that the Iraqi airpower capabilities enhance regional stability by preserving an 
appropriate balance of power. 
D. CONTEMPORARY AIRPOWER SECURITY COOPERATION EFFORTS 
Current levels of foreign assistance funding for Iraq are $2.3 billion for FY2007, 
which includes approximately $1.2 million for IMET, an amount that is to increase to a 
requested $2 million for FY2008.  IMET currently facilitates English language training 
for Iraqi soldiers with the hope that they can obtain a level of proficiency that will 
eventually permit their attendance at U.S. military schools.  Commercial defense trade 
also contributed defense articles and services to Iraq valued at over $834 billion in 2005. 
                                                 
201 Most recently, FMS included a sale of eighty Block-60 F-16s to the United Arab Emirates, a 
platform which provides technological advantages that the USAF will not enjoy until the arrival of the Joint 
Strike Fighter. “PROCUREMENT, United Arab Emirates,” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - The Gulf 
States, Date Posted: August 3, 2006. Available at http://jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA (accessed September 
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also upgrading its conventional forces; in the 1990s Iraq purchased MiG-29 fighters from Russian and has 
recently performed indigenous modifications to its fleet of F-5s. “World Air Forces-Iran,” Jane’s World Air 
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While the bulk of U.S. security cooperation efforts and resources are 
appropriately geared towards strengthening the army and police forces, the U.S. has 
commenced with the task of reconstituting the IqAF.  The organization responsible for 
standing up the IqAF is the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT), which by the 
end of June 2006 had rebuilt the Iraqi Air Force to a level of about 750 personnel, 155 of 
whom were pilots while the rest were maintainers, air traffic controllers, and security and 
logistics staff personnel.203  
Thus far equipping and training the IqAF has been centered on mission areas that 
support the ground forces’ counterinsurgency capabilities: reconnaissance, surveillance, 
troop transport, and casualty evacuation.  The CAFTT has emphasized reconnaissance in 
particular because of the need to protect key infrastructural assets such as oil pipelines 
and electrical grid components, both which are seen as primary interdiction targets of the 
insurgency because of their being critical to the stabilization of the Iraqi economy 
(Washington also would prefer that Iraq’s oil revenue help pay for any future IqAF 
acquisitions).204  Equipment acquisition thus far has been limited to a handful of C-130s, 
light propeller reconnaissance aircraft, and a fleet of Russian and American made 
                                                 
203 The goal is purportedly to build a force of about 2900 Iraqi airmen by the end of 2007. 
Accordingly the CAFTT is working to reestablish a pipeline for training Iraqi pilots; as of 2006, all of the 
pilots previously served in Saddam’s air force but most of these airmen are 38-40 years in age. There has 
been some success in bringing former air force pilots back to the service, but there have been instances of 
pilots being threatened by insurgents, and some purportedly have been assassinated for cooperating with 
the coalition. CENTCOM has recently put out a bid for private companies to provide pilot training to new 
Iraqi pilots and there have also been discussions of putting Iraqi pilot candidates through USAF pilot 
training. Caitlin Harrington, “U.S. Air Force Pursues Private Training for Iraqi Pilots,” Jane’s Defense 
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helicopters that are undergoing upgrades to give them modern capabilities.205  Notable 
characteristics of equipment procured thus far are the lack of defensive and offensive 
systems, making them vulnerability to insurgents’ threat systems and incapable of 
providing functions currently offered by coalition airpower assets, such as fire support to 
ground forces, communications jamming, and national air defense.206  While 
procurement thus far has focused on high-tech reconnaissance and surveillance 
capabilities rather than firepower or any measure of regional power projection, in the 
future Iraq must address its ability to ensure the sovereignty of its airspace.207  According 
to the Iraqi Air Force website, “there will be a time in the future for the Iraqi people to 
build a great Air Force.  Once it has defeated the insurgency, the Iraqi Armed Forces will 
turn attention to contributing to regional stability as a part of future coalitions. With a 
stable economy the country will initiate a great modernization program.”208  Current 
efforts led by the CAFFT represent the foundation on which long-term airpower security 
                                                 
205 For example, sixteen UH-1Hs given by Jordan are being upgraded to the Huey II configuration to 
improve their performance in hot climates. Also, eight Mi-17 helicopters from Poland have been delivered 
with plans for two more to be delivered at a later date. “ISR Platform To Be First Aircraft In Iraq's New 
Defense Purchasing Plan,” Inside the Air Force (Vol. 17, No. 25), June 23, 2006. Also: there are currently 
few tasks that the Iraqis conduct on their own; the two most notable are flying reconnaissance missions in 
support of Iraqi ground forces and performing maintenance on their fleet of C-130s. As a recent example, 
Iraqi pilots conducted air patrols over the streets of Baghdad during Ramadan. Efforts are ongoing to 
increase the tasks that Iraqi airmen will perform without assistance, such as air traffic control and airfield 
emergency response. “Iraqis Keep Eye In Sky During Ramadan,” U.S. Fed News, October 24, 2006. Also 
see “Iraqi Air Force Takes Over First-Line Maintenance,” U.S. Fed News, October 1, 2006. Finally: for 
airlift needs the plans are to acquire a total of six C-130 aircraft; currently, the primary reconnaissance asset 
for the Iraqi Air Force is the SAMA CH2000 light propeller aircraft. Stacy Fowler, 506th Air 
Expeditionary Group Public Affairs, “Mission accomplished for Airmen on project team,” Department Of 
Defense U.S. Air Force Releases, August 17, 2006. 
206 The importance of maintaining air superiority in the counterinsurgency cannot be overemphasized. 
While the term typically applies to efforts in dismantling national air defense systems, the concept is 
equally important to counterinsurgencies and “small wars.” As one recent study on the role of airpower in 
counterinsurgencies noted, “without some relative measure of air superiority from these weapons, the 
additional capabilities of airpower in small wars are greatly diminished.” Ronald F. Stuewe, Jr., One Step 
Back, Two Steps Forward: An Analytical Framework For Airpower In Small Wars, M.S. thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 2006., 61; Also, regarding threats to IqAf aircraft, see Patrick Cockburn, “U.S. 
fears insurgents have upgraded missiles as helicopter is shot down,” The Independent (London), February 
8, 2007.  
207 Michael Fabey, “Counter-insurgency ISR aircraft sought to fight Iraq insurgents,” Aerospace Daily 
& Defense Report, Monday, August 21, 2006, 5, Vol. 219, No. 34. 
208 “Air Forces,” July 22, 2006. Official Website of Multi-National-Force-Iraq. Available at 
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1099&Itemid=85 (accessed 
November 1, 2007). 
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cooperation can facilitate such a modernization program that also, perhaps, provides 
Washington with a conduit through which to influence Bagdad’s policy choices.   
E. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—REGIONAL STABILITY 
Both the Egypt and Pakistan cases suggest two factors effect airpower security 
cooperation’s ability to promote regional stability: first, Washington must adequately 
understand the state’s “strategic culture;” second, it must design its security cooperation 
programs (in particular FMS) to contribute to an appropriate regional balance of power.  
For Egypt and Pakistan, understanding these states’ strategic cultures entails 
comprehending the degree to which they weigh their national security with respect to a 
principal adversary: Israel for the case of Egypt, and India for case of Pakistan.   
Egypt’s strategic culture stresses the need for maintaining appropriate balance of 
power with respect to Israel through the maintenance of a modern and capable 
conventional force.  U.S. airpower security cooperation provides Egypt with a host of 
advanced weapons systems that have slightly lesser capabilities than those granted to 
Israel; nonetheless, in aggregate Egypt’s airpower capabilities present Israel with a 
substantial deterrent to offensive military action.  The result is a program that has made 
Egypt confident in its national security—the benefits of which include an enduring 
Egyptian-Israeli peace and Egypt’s diplomatic participation in resolving outstanding 
regional issues and conflicts, all of which contribute to inter-state regional stability. 
The Pakistan case suggests that a failure to understand a state’s strategic cultures 
denies U.S. decision makers the ability to forecast unintended outcomes of their policy 
choices.  The Pressler sanctions invoked by the Bush administration represented a well-
intended attempt to punish Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation activities.  However, the 
severing of the U.S.-Pakistani security relationship in the context of a wide power 
imbalance vis-à-vis a nuclear India portended an era of horizontal nuclear proliferation to 
rogue states and security policies that included “asymmetric strategies,” all of which 
countered the interests of the United States and contributed to an environment that 
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permitted Al Qaeda to prepare for the September 11, 2001 attacks.209  Also, the wide 
airpower imbalance that resulted in part due to Pressler sanctions created a dangerous 
environment in South Asia whereby Pakistan now relies on early use of its nuclear 
weapons in the event of war with India.  In short, regional stability was undermined by 
Washington’s collective management of security cooperation with Pakistan.  In contrast, 
since cooperation was re-initiated following since 2001, Islamabad has cooperated with 
New Delhi to reduce regional tensions, underscoring the concept that addressing a state’s 
needs with respect to its strategic paradigm can produce positive results. 
With regard to Iraq, one may make plausible assumptions regarding the state’s 
future strategic culture.  First, the post-Saddam constitutional Iraqi government will 
continue to be challenged by elements from within that disclaim its legitimacy.  The most 
fundamental and extreme groups will seek to overthrow the Iraqi government in order to 
establish an Islamic state based on Shariah law.210  Second, Iraq will deem its natural 
resources as being vital to its national security and will defend them against any regional 
actors that threaten its territory.  Third, Iraq will desire regional prestige and will not 
settle for being a second-tier regional state.  Fourth, Iraq will seek to maintain an overt 
appearance of autonomy from the United States (more so than the case of Egypt).  Anti-
Americanism sentiment among Iraqis since the U.S. invasion will continue to require 
Iraqi politicians to distance themselves from Washington in order to maintain their 
domestic legitimacy.  Iraq will desire its armed forces, including its airpower 
components, to serve this strategic paradigm. 
Exogenous factors that affect Iraq’s strategic environment include the following: 
the region’s Sunni regimes will view Iraq as a Shia state and will be suspicious of 
Iranian-Iraqi ties; Iraq will most likely adopt a moderate but nonetheless antagonistic 
                                                 
209 Pakistan’s security strategies that co-opted Islamic fundamentalist groups and supported the 
Taliban in Afghanistan created the space for Al Qaeda to operate in Afghanistan. Vali Nasr, “Islamic 
Extremism and Regional Conflict in South Asia,” in Prospects for Peace in South Asia, ed. Rafiq Dossani 
and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005) 25-29. 
210 Current factions labeled by MNFI as “terrorist groups” that are calling for an Islamic state in Iraq 
include: al-Qaida Organization in the Land of Two Rivers, Mujahideen Shura Council, Islamic Army in 
Iraq, and Ansar al-Sunnah. “The Insurgency,” 20 August 2007. Official Website for Multi-National-Force-
Iraq. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=729&Itemid=45 (accessed 
November 2, 2007). 
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posture toward Israel in order to preserve a perception of autonomy from the U.S. and 
credibility among Arab Muslims; Iraq will likely be moderate towards Iran but resist 
what it deems to be Iranian interference in Iraqi domestic affairs; finally, Iraq at the very 
least will view any Turkish incursion into northern Iraq as threatening stability in a region 
vital to Iraq’s economy because of the natural resources around Kirkuk.211  
Iraq’s position amid a multi-polar strategic dynamic differs from the cases of 
Egypt and Pakistan in that these states’ strategic cultures were oriented towards a 
principal adversary.  In these cases U.S. security cooperation facilitated stability when the 
recipient perceived that its armed forces’ conventional strength presented an effective 
deterrence to the adversary.  Likewise, failures to address the recipients’ perceived 
security needs fomented instability.  In order to design and implement an airpower 
security cooperation formula that creates an adequate deterrence while not being 
perceived as overly threatening, Washington will have to consider Iraq’s strategic culture 
with respect to the multitude of regional players. 
Iraq is likely to view Israel a threat if not its principal adversary.  There is no 
obvious issue over which the two states are bound to collide; however, Iraq is an Arab 
state, so it will take diplomatic positions against the Israeli state out of a necessity to 
maintain credibility.  Any events that bring about Israeli aggression toward an Arab state 
would certainly compel Iraq to sympathize with the Israeli foe at the very least; at the 
very worst, Iraq could choose to counter Israel directly as part of a broader Arab 
coalition.  While it is likely that the Iraqi state will eschew conflict with Israel, Israel’s 
military capabilities necessitate that Iraq be wary of its ability to project power. 
Iraq’s greatest potential for inter-state conflict in the near future is perhaps with 
its northern neighbor Turkey, who is dissatisfied with a perceived lack of control of 
Kurdish militants in northern Iraq.  Recently Turkey has threatened to intervene militarily 
                                                 
211 “Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Battle Over Kirkuk,” Middle East Report No. 56, July 18, 2006; 
International Crisis Group. Available online at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/sectarian/2006/0718kurds.pdf (accessed November 1, 
2007). Regarding fears of the Sunni regimes’ fears of rising Shia influence in the region, see Vali Nasr, The 
Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2006) 241-250. 
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if the U.S. and Iraqi governments do not address emboldened Kurdish separatist 
movements that operate within the “safe-haven” of northern Iraq.212  Whether or not this 
occurs in the near term, the status of a semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in northern 
Iraq will continue to irk Turkey’s strategic culture.  Any events that engender a Turkish 
invasion would be perceived by Iraq as a direct threat to its national interests; while 
Baghdad holds no favor toward Kurdish separatists, it would likely portray any Turkish 
intervention as “aggression” and may opt to resist to the extent possible.213 
Iraq’s posture towards Iran is difficult to predict.  With the fall of Saddam it is 
apparent that animosities regarding the Iran-Iraq war have waned.  The two states have 
natural ties because of their predominantly Shia populations, a fact that imbues 
skepticism among the region’s Sunni regimes.  However, the Shia factor could be 
superseded by disapproval over Iranian influence in Iraqi domestic affairs.  Nonetheless 
Iraq would likely eschew direct conflict with Iran making bilateral conflict between the 
two states doubtful in the foreseeable future. 214  Washington however seeks to check 
Iran’s attempts at expanding its influence in the region, an objective that finds accordance 
among the Gulf’s Sunni regimes.  Regardless of the method, the U.S. will seek to 
preserve a conventional capability in Iraq that deters Iran from any ideas of direct 
intervention with its military (or paramilitary) forces.  Therefore, it would be in 
Washington’s interest for Iraq’s airpower component to pose a significant challenge to 
the Iranian military.   
Toward Iraq’s neighboring Sunni regimes, the most significant of which is Saudi 
Arabia, it will have to contend with suspicions of an Iraqi-Iranian Shia nexus.  
Accordingly U.S. airpower security cooperation efforts must consider these suspicions 
                                                 
212 Michael Howard, “Turkey bombards northern Iraq after ambush,” The Guardian, Monday, 
October 22, 2007. Available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,2196358,00.html (accessed 
November 3, 2007). 
213 There is also potential that Turkey would view a strengthened U.S.-Iraqi security relationship as a 
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214 Abbas Kadhim, op. cit. 
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when developing Iraqi airpower capabilities so as not to imbue undue anxiety over Iraq’s 
military capabilities.  Saddam’s territorial aggression toward Kuwait is still recent 
history; Washington would not desire for memories of Iraq’s former aggressions to 
instigate fears that the Shia-dominated Iraqi government would do likewise at some point 
in the future.  
Because of ubiquitous U.S. FMS to the region, most of Iraq’s neighbors are 
equipped with U.S. defense industry articles such that Washington can manage 
qualitative and quantitative airpower balances.215  In order to maintain an appropriate 
regional balance of power Washington should consider the following principal regarding 
future airpower FMS to Iraq:  the IqAF should possess sufficient strength and capabilities 
to maintain air sovereignty and defend against territorial breaches while not possessing a 
significant capability to project power far beyond its borders.  Qualitatively, the IqAF 
should enjoy a significant advantage over the Iranian Air Force but no greater capability 
than parity with respect to other U.S. regional partners.216  In addition, with respect to 
Israel and Turkey in particular, the IqAF should possess lesser overall capabilities, thus 
1) preserving the Arab-Israeli airpower formula under which Israel enjoys a qualitative 
advantage to compensate for its quantitative disadvantage vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors 
and 2) preserving Turkey’s prestige and perception of favorability as a NATO ally of the 
U.S.  Toward limiting Iraq’s capacity to project power, Washington should not provide 
any indigenous air refueling capability.217   
Managing balance of power via FMS is only one aspect of airpower security 
cooperation through which Washington may affect regional stability.  Any measure by 
which the U.S. can increase Iraq’s security confidence can preclude the nascent 
constitutional regime from engaging in asymmetric strategies to bolster its inter-state 
                                                 
215 This does not prevent these states from acquiring weapon systems from other states such as 
France, Britain, China, and Russia, although provisions of financial assistance can create a compelling 
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216 With respect to Iran, because of sanctions following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that precluded 
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regional offensive power projection. 
 82
security.  Considering the host of sub-state actors who have perfected asymmetric 
strategies against U.S. forces in Iraq, the future unitary state could face similar challenges 
that Pakistan faced following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan—how to keep the 
jihadists occupied once their jihad was over.  One manner in which Islamabad co-opted 
non-state militants was by using them to challenge India’s conventional superiority 
through unrest and subversion in Kashmir.218  If Baghdad were to adopt similar strategies 
by co-opting its sub-state militant factions to address inter-state disputes, regional 
stability and U.S. interests would be directly undermined.  Iraq’s confidence in U.S. 
airpower security cooperation can help preclude the use of asymmetric means to assert 
state power. 
The relationship-oriented instruments of security cooperation are particularly 
well-suited to instilling sincerity of commitment on behalf of the U.S.  The case of 
Pakistan shows how interruptions in relationship-instruments facilitated unfavorable 
policy outcomes and challenged military operations initially after September 11th.  In 
contrast, the case of Egypt suggests that enduring and consistent military relationships 
have produced positive results, the most significant of which was the tangible measure of 
operational military cooperation by the Egyptians in the 1991 Gulf War.  In Iraq the U.S. 
has the opportunity to sow seeds for long-term airpower cooperation while reconstituting 
its airpower capabilities.  Accordingly, Washington can use instruments of IMET, USAF 
led pipeline training of Iraqi airmen, officer exchanges between the USAF and IqAF, and 
perhaps even combined squadrons to nurture the nascent relationship.  Put simply, the 
more interaction between U.S. and Iraqi airmen, the higher the perceived level of 
commitment to Iraq’s security—and with it, the greater the likelihood that Baghdad’s 
activities will promote regional stability.   
F. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
The potential for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East threatens the stability of 
an already volatile region.  It is highly likely that the future unitary state of Iraq will be 
pressured by structural factors that tempt it to once again “go nuclear.”  The question is to 
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what extent U.S. airpower security cooperation with Iraq can shape its nuclear choices.  
Interestingly, the cases of Egypt and Pakistan convey disparate results regarding the 
impact of U.S. security cooperation on a state’s nuclear choices.  On one hand, the case 
of Egypt suggests that robust security cooperation obviated its desires to have a nuclear 
deterrent amid what is presumed to be a nuclear-capable adversary.  On the other hand, 
Pakistan developed nuclear weapons covertly during substantial U.S. investment in its 
conventional airpower capabilities.  Yes, the nuclear threat to Pakistan was more overt 
because of India’s nuclear testing.  Yet one must consider that the Israeli nuclear policy 
of “ambiguity” exacts a similar pressure onto Egypt.  In order to address how U.S. 
airpower security cooperation with Iraq can influence that state’s choices, one must first 
account for the Egypt-Pakistan nuclear choice disparity. 
With respect to security cooperation as an instrument of influence, the difference 
in Egypt’s and Pakistan’s nuclear choices is best explained by what amounted to different 
levels of Washington’s comprehension of the recipients’ strategic culture—and the 
confidence inculcated to the recipients that security cooperation was addressing their 
principle security concerns.  For the case of Egypt, U.S. military assistance was a 
byproduct of the Camp David Accords peace treaty under which the Carter 
administration invested substantial diplomatic effort to address both sides’ security 
concerns.  U.S. influence with respect to Israel imbued Sadat with sufficient trust to press 
forth with the agreement—a trust bolstered by U.S. airpower security cooperation that 
afforded Egypt an appropriate level of conventional power vis-à-vis Israel. 
As for the case of Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was 
no such U.S. diplomatic involvement with the state’s principal rival India.  The security 
relationship was better defined as a temporary marriage of interests as opposed to an 
enduring security investment whereby the recipient’s real security concerns were 
addressed.  The lack of clarity regarding policy intent evidenced by different signals 
coming from the executive and congressional branches complicated matters.  However, a 
more coherent policy message warning against proliferation would have not mattered 
without greater U.S. diplomatic efforts addressing a strategic culture obsessed with 
survival against a nuclear-capable India.   
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In short, the disparate outcomes suggest that in order for airpower security 
cooperation to effectively influence Iraq toward nuclear non-proliferation (assuming that 
it would have a capacity to develop or acquire nuclear weapons), the policy must imbue 
confidence that Washington both comprehends Iraq’s security concern vis-à-vis a nuclear 
threat and has sufficient influence over the adversary representing the source of the 
threat.  In cases where the latter is not true, Washington may have to resort to firm 
security guarantees to keep Iraq true to a non-nuclear path.  The U.S. has substantial 
influence with all of Iraq’s potential regional adversaries except Iran, with whom it can 
currently attempt to influence only through punitive forms of diplomacy such as 
sanctions or armed conflict.  Amid a nuclear-capable adversary, any absence of trust in 
the U.S.-Iraqi security relationship could compel Iraq to seek its own nuclear capability; 
airpower security cooperation is one instrument through which Washington can bolster 
the level of trust between the two states. 
A second factor affecting Iraq’s future nuclear choices is the state’s inherent 
desire for prestige; assuming it chooses a non-nuclear strategic culture, its regional status 
will be directly linked to the prestige of the non-proliferation regime.  If the “wheels 
come off” the proverbial “non-proliferation wagon,” Iraq will face similar pressures as 
Egypt when considering its nuclear choices.  A capable and modern the Iraqi Air Force 
can counter the prestige-impetus for nuclear proliferation.  In a similar vein, the closer the 
relationship with U.S. airpower forces, the more able Iraq can sustain its status as an 
important player in the region.  While either of these factors cannot guarantee Iraq 
chooses non-proliferation as a component of its strategic culture, they can at least 
mitigate Iraq’s desires to obtain nuclear weapons merely to preserve a seat at the table of 
diplomacy.   
A third factor affecting Iraq’s nuclear choices is the potential influence by 
domestic interests promoting nuclear weapons development.  In lieu of Saddam’s past 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons, there already exists a potential “pro-nuclear” element 
consisting of former Iraqi nuclear scientists and engineers.  Airpower security 
cooperation is a limited tool with which to address this aspect, making current U.S. 
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efforts to keep Iraqi nuclear scientists gainfully employed seem prudent.219 Also, similar 
to social forces in Egypt that call for nuclear weapons as a measure to defend Islam, there 
exists the possibility that religious and political elements within Iraqi society could do 
likewise.  A combination of nuclear proliferation among the region’s states and 
worsening suspicions between Sunni and Shia governments adds another dynamic—
instead of calling for an “Islamic bomb” to challenge the west, regional tensions and 
domestic pressures could compel Iraq to acquire a “Shia bomb” in response to a “Sunni 
bomb.”220 
Once again, airpower security cooperation has a limited capacity to address these 
particular domestic pressures.  However, as in the case of Egypt suggests, it does allow 
Washington to engage the military that sits at the center of Iraq’s strategic culture; 
further, robust airpower security cooperation would compel any Iraqi regime to consider 
the costs of proliferating without Washington’s concurrence.  Another question is to what 
extent airpower security cooperation can assist Bagdad’s efforts in countering another 
form of domestic pressures—terrorists and sectarian militants in Iraq intent on 
overthrowing the constitutional regime. 
G. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—MILITARY COOPERATION INCLUDING 
THE GWOT 
The Bush administration and Al Qaeda agree that Iraq represents the principal 
battleground in the war between the two antagonists.  Put simply, Iraq represents the 
“front line” in the GWOT, and credibility for both players is at stake.  Al Qaeda’s quest 
to rid the region of U.S. influence and to eventually establish a pan-Islamic caliphate 
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centers on defeating the U.S. in Iraq.221  If U.S. forces withdraw, Al Qaeda will continue 
attempts to discredit and eventually overthrow the Iraqi regime it views as a product of 
U.S. imperialism.  The extent to which the constitutional-regime has to contend with 
terrorism and challenges to its authority depends on the level of political reconciliation 
that is yet to occur and the extent to which Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are able to 
maintain support among Iraqi society and the broader region. 
The cases of Egypt and Pakistan show that security cooperation since 9/11 has 
resulted in measurable cooperation by the respective governments in the form of 
intelligence, direct confrontation with Islamic militants and terrorist organizations, and 
access to supply routes and the use of airspace in support of OIF and OEF.  Inevitably, 
these regimes’ cooperation in the GWOT solidifies their alignment of interests with 
Washington—the latter needs the regimes’ continued cooperation and the former needs 
U.S. support in the form of economic assistance and security cooperation  to stay in 
power amid rising dissenting forces that are staunchly anti-American.  Iraq will likely be 
no different.  Survival of the post-Saddam constitutional government will require that it 
continue to counter extremist groups intent on its demise.  Airpower security cooperation 
is a tool that can build Baghdad’s capacity to fight terrorist groups and insurgents; 
however, the counter-insurgency strategist must consider that the indirect fires brought by 
airpower can also result in propaganda victories for the opposition if used incorrectly. 
This last point underscores an important consideration regarding airpower 
security cooperation over the near term.  Current Iraqi airpower capabilities center on 
reconnaissance and surveillance and have no offensive capability, mandating that any 
indirect fires from airpower in support of Iraqi ground forces be delivered by U.S. 
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airpower assets.222  In the event that U.S. ground forces withdraw, the question remains 
as to if coalition air assets will be used to support the Iraqi ground forces.  As a recent 
journal reported:  “senior military leaders continue to debate how fire support will be 
called in to support Iraqi forces' security operations after U.S. troops leave that 
nation…In short, Moseley [Chief of Staff, USAF] said senior leaders simply ‘don't know’ 
at this point what the tactical air support policy for post-occupied Iraq will look like.”223   
Using air assets to provide fire support to ground forces engaged in 
counterinsurgency is no simple matter.  The procedures used by American forces have 
evolved from the lessons learned since the Korean War and are designed to maximize 
flexibility, responsiveness, and lethality of air-delivered fire support while mitigating 
risks to friendly forces on the ground; also, in counter-insurgency (COIN) the mitigation 
of unwanted collateral damage is a particularly important component of the effective use 
of airpower.224  Hence, delegating control of CAS (close-air-support) events to Iraqis is 
problematic considering the resources required to training a fully qualified JTAC (Joint 
Terminal Attack Controller) as well as the hosts of risks involved if American 
commanders were to delegate control of American air attack assets to Iraqis on the 
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ground.225  First, because CAS procedures are communications-intensive, the language 
barrier is an extensive obstacle; American pilots would be appropriately hesitant to 
engage if they could not understand the directions of the controller.226  Second, if the 
wrong target is hit due to misidentification, error in coordinates or target marking, 
language barriers, or simply weapons system malfunction (which probabilities suggest 
will occur given enough events), adverse outcomes could result in finger-pointing as to 
who was responsible and could engender mistrust between Iraqi ground forces and U.S. 
pilots.   Regardless, if recent trends continue, effective and responsive fire support will be 
needed to combat the insurgency.227  Eliminating fire support from U.S. airpower assets 
portends a tactical disadvantage for Iraqi security forces given the fact that the IqAF 
currently has no such capabilities. 
Hence, there are essentially three options regarding airpower and fire support for 
the Iraqi Security Forces in conjunction with a reduction or withdrawal of American 
ground troops.  First, Washington could imbed U.S. JTACs directly into Iraqi units so 
that they could orchestrate fire support for Iraqi ground commanders.  Second, the USAF 
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uses primarily enlisted airmen to function as JTACs in Air Support Operations Squadrons; these units are 
generally tied to specific army units for training and combat operations. The Marine Corps uses Marine 
aviation officers for their JTACs (known as Forward Air Controllers, or FACs), while the special 
operations community typically relies on Air Force Combat Controllers who carry the JTAC qualification. 
The Air Force and Marine Corps also train pilots who are trained to control CAS events from the air with 
or without the assistance of a JTAC, known as FAC(A) (Forward Air Controller-Airborne). 
226 Author’s opinion is based upon pilot experience conducting CAS with foreign controllers. 
227 According to daily CENTAF airpower summaries, coalition fixed wing assets flew an average of 
33 CAS sorties per day during the month of November 2006 and provided actual fire-support to ground 
forces an average of three times per day. A fire-support event in this case does not necessarily equate to the 
number of aircraft or weapons used against a target, just that fire support in a particular area was provided. 
Data was obtained from published CENTAF daily airpower summaries from November 1-30.  
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could train Iraqis in the art of terminal attack control and accept the inherent risks and 
limitations of relying on coalition air assets. Third, U.S. security cooperation could 
sufficiently equip the IqAF to provide some measure of kinetic strike capability so that 
the entire kill-chain, start-to-finish, was owned by Iraqi forces. 
The first option, imbedding USAF and/or Marine JTACs with Iraqi units, may 
appear to be the easiest to implement in the near term, as they are already trained and 
equipped to provide air-delivered fire support to Iraqi ground commanders.  The biggest 
challenge in implementing this option would be training the Iraqi commanders as to how 
best utilize their JTAC and airpower assets, as well as teaching them to consider 
fratricide potential and collateral damage avoidance.  There are some obvious drawbacks 
to this option:  Placing American individuals directly in Iraqi units subjects their 
individual security to the protection of those units.  Also the potential still exists for 
adverse political outcomes due to missed targets; if a bomb misses its intended target, 
collateral damage could foment mistrust between the Iraqis and the U.S. controller.  The 
second option, training Iraqis to conduct their own fire support, eliminates the personal 
risk to the JTAC but retains the risk of potential adverse outcomes that is inherent when 
relying on coalition firepower to support Iraqi units.  Only if U.S. airpower security 
cooperation builds an IqAF that has the capacity to provide effective, precision targeting 
capability in support of Iraqi ground troops can these adverse potentialities be avoided.  
Firepower could come from helicopter, fixed-wing, or unmanned platforms.  The critical 
requirements are that the assets be survivable in the contemporary COIN environment 
and that the sensor-weapon combination provides a high level of precision and small 
yield explosive such that collateral damage can be mitigated.  
In sum, the best option for the provision of air-delivered fire support for the COIN 
is for the Iraqis to control their own firepower from their own assets that ideally would be 
survivable and provide day-or-night precision, low yield kinetic effects.  As per the 
recent recommendations of the Iraqi Study Group, reliance on American combat 
capability is not conducive to the long term success of the mission in Iraq.228  Recently 
                                                 
228 Iraqi Study Group Report, op. cit., 7-76. 
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published USAF doctrine on Irregular Warfare agrees, stating that “the best way to apply 
airpower in IW [irregular warfare] is often by, with, and through the PN’s [partner 
nation’s] air force.”229  Towards this objective, U.S. airpower security cooperation can 
facilitate Iraqi effectiveness in the GWOT by organizing, training, and equipping the 
IqAf to provide precision firepower in support of ground elements fighting extremists 
bent on challenging the constitutional regime—a regime through which the Bush 
administration hopes to eventually advance democracy throughout the region.   
H. PREDICTING INFLUENCE—DEMOCRACY ADVANCEMENT 
In the cases of Egypt and Pakistan there is unfortunately little to no correlation 
between security cooperation and democracy advancement.  Each of these regimes has 
faced or is currently facing significant domestic pressures and security concerns that 
threaten regime survival, a factor which facilitates an enduring and disproportionate 
influence by the military on state politics.230  Arguably, security cooperation instruments 
enable these unfavorable military-political power structures; however, the pragmatic 
utility of these instruments is that they do provide Washington a conduit through which to 
engage those with decision-making power.  It remains to be seen how “democratic” Iraq 
will be, but in lieu of the poor security situation, ongoing sectarian strife, and the 
importance of Iraq to Al Qaeda, one may presume that the military and other security 
forces will preserve influence with those who hold decision-making power in the 
government.  U.S. State Department goals of using security cooperation as a means 
through which to convey U.S. democratic values in Iraq are laudable.  However, it is 
perhaps more realistic to expect that airpower security cooperation be used as an 
instrument to secure Iraq internally and externally so that other instruments can be used 
to advance democracy in Iraq.  In any case, the effort will require a persistent airpower 
relationship that lasts decades rather than years. 
                                                 
229 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare. August 1, 2007, 28-29. 
230 For more information on the impact of the military on Middle East politics, see: Picard, Elizabeth. 
“Arab Military in Politics: from Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State.” In The Arab State, edited by 
Giacomo Luciani, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 189-219. Also Richards, Alan, and John 
Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development; “Ch. 13: 
The Military and the State” (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990) 353-373. 
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V. CONCLUSION—FINAL OBSERVATIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify characteristics of airpower security 
cooperation that produce tangible results that serve the interests of the United States.  
Toward this pursuit, the “Introduction” chapter posed the following questions:   
• Have airpower security cooperation programs been implemented with 
clearly articulated policy goals and desired outcomes?   
Since 9/11, the answer is clearly “yes.”  There are a host of national strategy 
documents that emphasize partnering with foreign states as a critical element of the 
national security strategy of the United States.  The theme is common throughout the 
National Security Strategy, National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, National Defense 
Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as the 
military’s joint doctrine documents.  For each partnering state the State Department sets 
broad security cooperation policy goals while the Defense Department executes security 
cooperation activities through the COCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Strategy 
(TSCS). In support of the TSCS, SAF/IA develops an airpower security cooperation 
plans according to guidance of the USAF Security Cooperation Strategy.  Newly released 
Air Force Doctrine Documents regarding Irregular Warfare and Internal Defense guide 
the operational implementation of airpower security cooperation activates, while the 
SAF/IA Security Assistance Handbook provides guidance to country directors for 
airpower FMS programs. 
At the national level of government, however, the implementation of the Pressler 
sanctions onto Pakistan following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan showed that 
policy cohesion can be challenged by variances in intent between the executive and 
congressional branches of government.  This is not to state that Congress should avoid 
intervening to ensure security cooperation programs serve the interests of the U.S.  
Rather, it is merely an observation that stresses a need for the national security 
institutions to adequately comprehend the recipient’s strategic culture when setting policy  
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objectives for security cooperation programs; it also suggests that analysts carefully 
examine and communicate to Congress any potential consequences deriving from 
coercive utilization of the security cooperation instrument. 
• What factors determined the success or failure of airpower security 
cooperation as a policy instrument?   
The cases of Pakistan and Egypt suggest that key variables affecting the success 
of airpower security cooperation as a diplomacy instrument are: 1) the degree to which 
the security cooperation program addresses the recipient’s principal security needs as 
determined by the state’s strategic culture; 2) the degree to which airpower assistance 
facilitates and maintains an appropriate regional balance of power; and 3) the degree of 
trust imbued to the recipient regarding the endurance of the U.S. commitment to the 
security relationship.  If Washington can account for these “three tenets” when 
implementing airpower security cooperation, the recipient state is more likely to “feel 
secure” and hence is more likely to act responsibly in ways that engender regional 
stability.  Concomitantly Washington can then expect to garner specific measures of 
influence with respect to the recipient in manners which serve U.S. security interests. 
• To what extent has the United States gained diplomatic leverage via 
airpower security cooperation?  
Security cooperation activities are most effective when treated as an investment in 
a relationship as opposed to payment for services rendered by the recipient.  Leverage 
can be a two-way street depending on the severity of needs of the U.S. and partnering 
state.  If either party has no alternative partner in the supplier-recipient relationship, they 
can expect to have a lesser capacity to influence the other.  Certainly, after the U.S. is 
entrenched in a state’s strategic culture, as is now the case with Egypt, it may exact 
influence by the mere fact that it is the sole provider for parts and modernization 
capabilities related to the recipient’s airpower assets.  If a state does not depend on U.S 
financial assistance as part of the security relationship, the U.S. loses a degree of 
influence because of ample opportunities for the recipient to find other security partners 
(for example, any one of the members of the UNSC are prolific arms suppliers). 
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In addition, the United State’s place in the world provides the recipient of 
airpower security cooperation with added leverage onto the international system, a 
benefit through which Washington also derives influence.  The cases of Pakistan and 
Egypt suggests that when airpower security cooperation accounts for the aforementioned 
key variables, Washington can expect to garner the recipient’s cooperation in matters 
related to regional stability, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the GWOT.  
Thus far, however, influence regarding democracy reforms in these recipients has been 
less apparent, an outcome that alludes to a need for patience—or perhaps an unrealistic 
policy objective considering the domestic instability in these recipient states. 
If cases where the U.S. has no alternative to the recipient’s specific manners of 
cooperation, it can expect limits on its capacity to shape the recipient government’s 
policies.  In such cases, attempts at using security cooperation instruments as manners of 
coercion are bound to either be unsuccessful or produce unintended consequences.  
Unfortunately, this assertion portends difficulty in coercive attempts with respect to a 
unitary Iraqi government.  The success of Iraq is critical to U.S. prestige not only in the 
region, but the world—a fact upon which any future Iraqi government may exact leverage 
onto the U.S. and resist any attempts at using airpower security cooperation as a means of 
coercive influence.  In particular, legislative calls for military aid to be conditioned by 
proven democratic reforms on behalf of the recipient (as has been suggested recently for 
both Pakistan and Egypt) are not practical given the degree to which the U.S. needs the 
Iraqi constitutional government to succeed.  In short, the consequences of Pressler-like 
sanctions with respect to Iraq would need to be weighed carefully before their 
implementation, whether they were intended for democracy promotion, human rights, 
regional policies, or non-proliferation cooperation. 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States has an opportunity to sow seeds for an enduring relationship 
with Iraq through airpower security cooperation, commencing with rebuilding the Iraqi 
Air Force.  To be successful over the long haul, the USAF and other governmental 
agencies should implement policies intentionally designed to address the “three tenets” of 
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security cooperation: addressing strategic culture, maintaining an appropriate balance of 
power, and inculcating trust.  Recently published USAF doctrine emphasizing security 
cooperation is a good start.  Other considerations follow: 
First, as Iraq under the post-Saddam constitutional regime is still challenged by 
internal security, its strategic culture is driven by survival from internal threats and for 
the most part does not yet account for external inter-state rivalries.  Accordingly, initial 
efforts to supply, train, and equip the IqAF to the COIN mission are prudent.  Also, the 
CAFTT should amend acquisition efforts to include a platform with a precision strike 
capability so that the IqAF can support ground forces engaged in COIN; failure to 
provide this capability either denies the Iraqis airpower capabilities now exclusively 
enjoyed by coalition forces or places USAF and other coalition airmen in the difficult 
position of providing fire support directly to Iraqi ground commanders—the risks of 
which exceed any potential benefit.  Simply put, it is best for the Iraqis to own and 
operate their own assets that provide fire support to their own troops. 
Long term airpower security cooperation should not limit the IqAF to the COIN 
mission, but should take into account all the roles that airpower provides the state—
particularly maintaining the sovereignty of the Iraqi airspace.  Toward that end, the FMS 
instrument should provide Iraq with a modern fighter force that contributes an 
appropriate balance of power amid the multi-polar regional environment.  Forecasting the 
provision of specific weapon systems is not warranted; however in general the IqAf 
should enjoy a qualitative advantage vis-à-vis Iran, be of lesser capability than Israel and 
perhaps Turkey, and be of no greater than parity with respect other regional neighbors.  
Accordingly, airpower security cooperation efforts should eschew granting the IqAF an 
indigenous air-refueling capability in order to limit its power projection reach.  
Eventually, the goal should be to build a modern Iraqi Air Force that provides the sate 
with a substantial measure of prestige in the region. 
Finally, Washington should use the relationship-oriented components of airpower 
security cooperation to inculcate the Iraqi state with trust in the U.S. commitment.  This 
goal suggests the need for an enduring presence of U.S. airmen working side-by-side 
with Iraqi airmen for years to come.  A recent RAND study suggested that the COIN 
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mission in particular calls for the USAF to institutionalize “airpower advising,” stating 
that “the best role for outsiders is an indirect one: training, advising, and equipping the 
local nation, which must win the war politically and militarily.”231   
For the airpower security cooperation effort with Iraq to build trust, relationships 
will matter, and the quality of relationships will be affected by individuals’ cultural 
understanding.  Accordingly, the USAF would be wise to allocate time and resources to 
giving its advisors the same language and cultural skills possessed by their Army 
counterparts.  The USAF should tap into its already established international-affairs-
specialist (IAS) program to train qualified advisors for the Iraqi airpower security 
cooperation mission.232  Obviously this effort involves substantial investment in time and 
resources, especially for aircrew; longer tour lengths than those associated with current 
AEF rotations would therefore be appropriate.  Also, over time the USAF should 
consider granting Iraqi airmen the same exchange opportunities now enjoyed by our 
major allies, including operational fighter pilot exchanges. 
B. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
While the author believes the findings of this thesis and concomitant 
recommendations to be valid, they were the result of analysis that faced certain 
methodological limitations.  First, the reliance on open-source information limited the 
amount of information available regarding specific measures of military and intelligence 
cooperation with Pakistan and Egypt, most of which is classified; even the broad 
guidance contained in the CENTOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan is not available 
in open channels.   
                                                 
231 Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, Karl P. Mueller, Airpower in the New 
Counterinsurgency Era, The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006) 4. Also, the Iraqi Study Group Report suggested that the best role 
for the U.S. military was to train the Iraqis to fight the insurgency with minimal direct assistance form U.S. 
forces. 
232 The RAND report further recommends that the USAF should tap into its expanding political-
military-affairs specialist program to meet the need for more advisors: “there will be a natural synergy 
between the expansion of USAF’s counterinsurgency cadre and the services’ international affairs specialist 
program. Personnel with advisory experience should make excellent international affairs specialists, and 
(potentially) vice versa. Both programs will need to be expanded and strengthened in parallel.” Vick et al., 
op. cit., 145. 
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Second, there are admittedly some gaps that the thesis’ analysis failed to 
overcome.  This study presented recipients’ national security policies and diplomatic 
activities as representing outcomes of U.S. airpower security cooperation policies; 
however, it is safer to assert that airpower security cooperation contributed (or at the very 
least correlated) to these outcomes and did not comprise a direct causal link; nonetheless, 
the results of the study suggests airpower security cooperation contributes to positive 
policy results when the aforementioned variables are included as antecedent conditions:  
1) addressing recipient security needs, 2) maintaining appropriate levels of regional 
balance of power, and 3) instilling trust in the recipient’s relationship with the United 
States.   
In order to fill in remaining gaps toward a more comprehensive cause-and-effect 
process, research would need to be conducted in the presence of actual airpower security 
cooperation activities—an effort requiring research to be accomplished on site and at 
higher classification levels.  In addition, more case studies are needed to wholly validate 
these variables as viable conditions on which to base successful policies.233  Any attempt 
to conduct “large-N” study of airpower security cooperation as an instrument of national 
policy would require a quantitative method to be devised whereby dependent and 
independent variables, conditions, and suitable metrics were designed and measured.  
Currently however it is difficult to quantify and measure specific effects of relationship-
oriented components of security cooperation such as IMET, officer-exchange programs, 
and combined training.  For example, the U.S. government does not track the careers of 
foreign officers who participate in IMET, so there is no way to validate the assumption 
that this instrument inculcates these officers with an appreciation for civilian control of 
the military, human rights, and other democratic values.234  Perhaps such an effort is 
warranted in the future.  In any case, the State Department and USAF should study  
 
                                                 
233 The foregoing analysis suffers from what political scientists would call the “small-N” problem, 
whereby the data set is too limited to produce any statistically viable results.  
234 James F. Mueller, Major, USAF; Country Director, Mideast/ Africa Division International Affairs, 
Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs Division. E-mail correspondence with the author, October 
29, 2007. 
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airpower security cooperation efforts with Iraq closely so they may garner as much 
knowledge as possible from this unique opportunity to utilize this particular policy 
instrument.   
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